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Until the early 1990s, the discussions on fiscal policy primarily centered on the 
functions of economic stabilization, income redistribution and resource allocation. 
Long-term growth was not usually viewed as an end itself, and fiscal policy was 
often not sufficiently tailored to the different circumstances and priorities of coun-
tries at different stages of development. It is only relatively recently that the dis-
cussion has gradually focused on the links between different dimensions of quality 
of public finances and economic growth. 
Based on the conceptual framework for linking the quality of public finances 
and economic growth that has been developed by the European Commission and 
applied to the EU Member States, this study examines the conditions under which 
the budgetary policy, and more specifically expenditure, revenue and financing 
design would be supportive of growth in the Mediterranean partner countries of 
the European Union. The study also highlights some of the interlinkages between 
fiscal policy and growth and summarises empirical findings found in the literature 
with particular focus on Mediterranean partner countries of the European Union. 
The main findings of the study are similar to those that apply to the EU Member 
States and can be summarised as follows: 
•  The way government expenditures are financed matters. Deficit and 
debt financing clearly undermines growth performance. 
•  The composition of expenditure does matter however the efficiency of 
the expenditure undertaken is even more important for growth. For 
countries with good governance indicators the positive impact of the 
productive expenditures on growth was enhanced. The analysis was 
applied to the efficiency of education and health expenditures with ba-
sically similar results. 
•  Notwithstanding the importance of 'fair' income distribution, when tax 
policy relies heavily on income taxation to do so, the analysis suggests 
a likely negative effect on growth. Specifically, consumption taxes 
were found to depress growth by up to four times less than income 
taxes. 
The study concludes by highlighting possible areas in the planning and execu-
tion of fiscal policy and governance where growth enhancing interventions can be 
applied. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
 




Until the early 1990s, the discussions on fiscal policy primarily largely cen-
tered on the functions of economic stabilization, income redistribution and re-
source allocation. Long-term growth was not usually viewed as an end by itself, 
and fiscal policy was often not sufficiently tailored to the different circumstances 
and priorities of countries at different stages of development. It was only in the 
early 1990s that the growth implications of fiscal policy moved to the center of the 
debate. In the earlier literature, fiscal policy and the discussion of its impact on 
growth focused on broad aggregates, levels and trends. It is only relatively re-
cently that more disaggregated fiscal parameters are being discussed in the context 
of growth. While the role of the fiscal policy as a linchpin of a sound macro posi-
tion and a sustainable debt strategy has hardly been disputed, the discussion has 
gradually focused on the conditions under which the budgetary policy, and more 
specifically its expenditure, revenue and financing design, would be supportive of 
growth. 
These issues have already been thoroughly debated within the EU in the con-
text of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the Strategy and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and hold clear lessons for the Mediterranean (MED) partner countries. The 
Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial Meetings held since June 2005 have 
stressed the importance of the reform of public finance management as part of a 
broader process of economic and institutional change aimed at fostering higher 
growth and employment. 
The link between fiscal policy and growth has been studied in academia, but 
has recently also been the subject of thorough analyses by the European Commis-
sion, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These studies have set 
the stage for the analysis undertaken in this study. The study explores empirically 
the nature of the growth-fiscal link in the MED partner countries, drawing on the 
lessons of these and other recent studies. It investigates to what extent the lessons 
drawn from these earlier studies apply to the Partner countries the Mediterranean 
region. 
The main findings of this analysis can be summarized as follows: 
•  The size of government, measured by the share of budgetary expendi-
tures in GDP, does not seem to be significantly be related to per capita 
income growth. Countries with large or small governmental expendi-
tures can achieve the same growth performance. However when gov-
ernance is taken into account countries that score favorably experience Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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a strong positive relationship between the size of government and 
growth.; 
•  It does matter much how these government expenditures are financed. 
Deficit and debt financing clearly undermines the growth perform-
ance. This result is a robust one and does not depend on the formula-
tion of the relationship analyzed. This finding confirms that economic 
stability is a necessary pre-condition for growth; 
•  The composition of expenditure does matter and so does the efficiency 
with which expenditure is undertaken. The study finds that expendi-
tures classified as productive do positively influence growth while 
those classified as unproductive have no significant impact on growth. 
The way these expenditures are undertaken – referred to as govern-
ance in this study – do however, greatly affect their impact on growth. 
The present study relies on data on general governance for each coun-
try in the sample and used them to weight the productive and unpro-
ductive expenditures in the regression specifications. The result was 
that for countries with good governance indicators the positive impact 
of the productive expenditures on growth was enhanced. That impact 
was reduced or even nullified in countries that score low on govern-
ance. The conclusion is that countries that want to use fiscal policy to 
achieve higher growth might need to focus on improving their govern-
ance rather than on spending more. It is not the remit of this study to 
suggest an action plan for the improvement of governance, but this de-
serves more attention than it probably has received from fiscal policy 
makers; 
•  These findings on the efficiency of productive expenditure were re-
fined by looking at education expenditure. The ultimate purpose was 
to trace the budget funding on these functions to outcomes in terms of 
education and health achievements. Education expenditures were 
found to improve education outcomes – defined as net enrollment in 
secondary education – when no account is taken of the country gov-
ernance scores. However when these indicators are used to weight the 
education expenditure the result suggests that countries with good 
scores can obtain very significant improvements in their education 
outcomes, whereas for countries with poor governance scores these 
additional expenditures would hardly improve their education out-
comes. If countries that score low on their governance indicators 
would increase their score to the sample average, they could educa-
tional outcomes substantially; PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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•  The analysis was also applied to the efficiency of health expenditures 
with basically similar results. For the same level of expenditure, coun-
tries with good governance scores achieve a much better result in 
terms of child mortality and life expectancy than countries that score 
low;  
•  The study also investigated the argument that the composition of 
revenue influences growth and confirmed the theoretical bias in favor 
of consumption taxes. In a well specified regression specification 
taxation depresses growth, but this effect is enhanced when the com-
position of revenue is biased towards income taxes. Specifically con-
sumption taxes are found to depress growth by up to four times less 
than income taxes. The lesson here is that increasing the reliance on 
broad based consumption taxes would stimulate growth; a conclusion 
that should inform the medium-term tax reform in countries that rely 
heavily on income taxation. 
Further research could focus on improving the data on budget flows and on 
outcomes of government programs so that a closer relationship is established be-
tween the flow of government funds and the output and outcome investigated. 
Also, country specific investigations in fiscal policy and growth are likely to pro-
vide additional insights on these issues than the analysis reported on here as they 
could rely on better data and fully account for country specific circumstances. 
Also the proxy indicators used in this study for governance efficiency could be 
replaced by indicators that better reflect such issues as budget preparation and 
execution including the reliance on elements of zero base and performance budget-
ing, multi year budget frameworks works and specialized (independent) budget 
oversight outfits.  
Main policy recommendations: 
•  Maintaining macro stability is a precondition for growth and deserves 
the continued attention of policy makers. Countries may want to in-
vestigate the use of fiscal rules to anchor their stability policy; 
•  Fiscal policy in countries that operate within a good governance con-
text have better results that those that score lower. Even though the 
governance indicators used in this study were not specifically targeted 
towards good fiscal policy, the results obtained in this study suggests 
strongly that investing in good budget governance is likely to pay off 
handsomely. Medium-term budget programming and selectively in-
troducing performance informed budget procedures are suggested; 
•  Shifting the expenditure structure away from non-productive towards 
productive expenditure is expected to enhance growth; countries Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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would do well to apply this rule but to obtain a good and agreed upon 
classification of what expenditures are “productive” and what are 
“non-productive”. In some countries this may suggest a reduction in 
subsidies; 
•  Tax reform would help growth o if it were to emphasize the mobiliza-
tion of fiscal revenue though domestic consumption taxes and deem-
phasize income taxes. Trade liberalization –which itself is growth en-
hancing – will undermine the revenue generation capacity of taxes on 
international trade; replacing these taxes with broad based consump-
tion taxes would not only assist fiscal stability but would also posi-
tively impact on growth. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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1. Introduction and Background 
Until the early 1990s, the discussions on fiscal policy primarily centered on its 
Mugravian dimensions of economic stabilization, income redistribution and re-
source allocation. Fiscal policy was typically discussed at the macro level as a 
component of a broader economic-stabilizing policy set (also including the mone-
tary and exchange rate policy), and at the micro level as a mechanism for allocat-
ing and distributing resources through taxation and transfers. Long term growth, 
often viewed as a natural by-product of stabilization policies, was not usually an 
end by itself, and fiscal policy was often not sufficiently tailored to the different 
circumstances and priorities of countries at different stages of development. It was 
only in the early 1990s, following the pioneering works of Barro (1991) and others 
on the endogenous growth theory, that the growth implications of fiscal policy 
moved to the center of the debate
1. In the earlier literature, fiscal policy and the 
discussion of its impact on growth focused on broad aggregates, levels and trends. 
It is only relatively recently that more disaggregated fiscal parameters, in addition 
to other parameters dealing with country specifics, are being discussed in the con-
text of growth. 
In a nutshell the question confronting the policymakers is whether there are po-
tential trade-offs and even possible conflicts between the short term and long term 
objectives surrounding growth and fiscal policy? While the role of the fiscal policy 
as a linchpin of a sound macro position and a sustainable debt strategy has hardly 
been disputed, the discussion has gradually focused on the conditions under which 
the budgetary policy, and more specifically its expenditure, revenue and financing 
design, would be supportive of growth. 
The endogenous growth literature has tried to establish a negative (positive) 
link between growth and “unproductive” (“productive”) expenditure and “distor-
tionary” (“non-distortionary”) taxation. While the theoretical and intuitive under-
pinning of the fiscal-growth link is fairly strong, the empirical results have been 
less than persuasive, partly because of data shortcomings, but also because of 
definitional issues (for example, those surrounding “productive” vs. “unproduc-
                                                 
1 Tanzi and Zee (1997) reviewed the early literature on endogenous growth theory and 
conclude the fiscal policy could affect long term growth, notwithstanding the difficulties is 
obtaining empirical support. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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tive” expenditures, or “distortionary” vs. non-distortionary” taxes), and the estima-
tion methods. The nature and degree of causality and simultaneity between fiscal 
policy and growth have also been subject to debate. Specific country peculiarities 
and characteristics, including relative resource endowments, institutional factors, 
governance and enforcement issues, and a host of other initial conditions have also 
reduced the scope of sweeping generalizations on the impact of fiscal policy on 
long term growth. 
These issues have already been thoroughly debated within the EU in the con-
text of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the Strategy and Growth Pact 
(SGP). The Lisbon Strategy clearly recognized the nexus between the fiscal policy 
(supported by structural reforms), growth and job creation, and directed the debate 
toward the nature of public spending and tax structure in support of these objec-
tives. Initially, the debate within the EU on the SGP and effective fiscal surveil-
lance centered on the long term sustainability of public finances, but the subse-
quent revision of the SGP allowed for country specific medium-term budgetary 
objectives, and brought on board other fiscal parameters to assess the quality of 
public finances. Issues related to the composition and efficiency of public spend-
ing and taxation, and those related to the institutions, enforcement and governance 
entered the debate. 
The EU experience holds clear lessons for the Mediterranean (MED) partner 
countries. The first Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial Meetings in Skhirat 
in June 2005 stressed the importance of upgrading public finance management as 
one of the four priority areas for accelerated reform in the MED partner countries. 
Building on that, the subsequent Ministerial Meetings (in Tunis in June 2006 and 
Porto in September 2007) concluded that the reform of public finance management 
is part of a broader process of economic and institutional change aimed at foster-
ing higher growth and employment, and lessening the vulnerability of the MED 
economies to external shocks. In fact, the Ministers concluded that the challenges 
faced by the MED partner countries were indeed similar to those of the EU
2. In 
September 2007, the ministers of Economy and Finance from the Euro-
Mediterranean region agreed on the creation of a Euro-Med network of Public 
Finance Experts. Taking into account the ongoing-debate within the EU on the 
quality of public finance and the main challenge facing the Mediterranean region, 
the interest for the network of experts was to include fiscal consolidation as part of 
a broader agenda for public sector reform, growth and employment and a review 
of the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue and expenditure. In this context, this 
study is undertaken to help develop a framework for the analysis of quality of 
public finances in the context of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries and to 
                                                 
2 European Commission (2006). PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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help develop a more specific agenda for future research and policy dialogue for the 
EU partner countries in this area. 
The purpose of this study is to explore empirically the nature of the growth-
fiscal link in the MED partner countries, drawing as much as possible on the les-
sons of the EU but also from the experience of developing countries. Section II 
reviews the existing literature on the subject, focusing on the findings of a number 
of recent studies that could contribute to the understanding of the growth-fiscal 
link in the MED partner countries. Section III provides some stylized facts of the 
fiscal variable that are used in the study’s analysis. Section IV outlines the analyti-
cal methodology, discusses the data issues and reports on the empirical findings. 
The key recommendations of the study are summarized in Section V and, finally, 
Section VI presents proposals for further research. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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2. Review of Recent Literature 
There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature on the link between fiscal 
policy and growth. Outside the academia, the regional and international institu-
tions, particularly the European Commission, the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, have initiated most of the recent empirical work. Two com-
prehensive studies are particularly relevant for the MED partner countries: the EC 
report “Public Finances in EMU-2008”
3, and the World Bank report “Fiscal Policy 
for Growth and Development”
4. In addition, there are a number of other recent 
empirical studies reporting findings on different sub-sets of developing countries. 
The MED partner represents a diverse group of countries in terms of their stages 
of economic development and resource endowment, and thus the experience of 
these countries could hold important lessons for the MED partner countries. 
 
 
2.1.  EC Report: “Public Finances in EMU-2008 
 
The study identifies a number of dimensions through which fiscal policy could 
influence growth, while stressing its pivotal role in macroeconomic stability and 
debt sustainability. Other studies have focused on one or some of these elements, 
but the EU study probably provides the most comprehensive coverage of these 
multiple fiscal links and brings together the different dimensions of the quality of 
public finances (QPF) that have been mostly studied in isolation. This multi-
dimensional framework reflects the complex relationship between the QPF and 
growth, and the multiplicity of fiscal policy objectives and constraints. The report 
identifies six fiscal and non-fiscal QPF dimensions and their links to growth; most 
of them would be relevant to the MED partner countries: 
1. The size of the public sector (measured by the share of total expenditure to 
GDP) has at best a weak link to growth (measured as per capita income) in the EU. 
There is a positive link for some countries (at the both ends of the income ladder) 
and for certain time periods. For countries with smaller public sectors and lower 
                                                 
3 European Commission (2008). 
4 World Bank (2007). PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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per capita incomes, there could be an initial positive growth impulse by increasing 
the productivity of labor and capital by increasing the supply of public goods. 
However, there is a fast diminishing marginal rate of return to such spending that 
could turn negative as distortions (for example, higher taxes to offset higher 
spending) set in. In any event, the large size of the government is not necessarily a 
deterrent to growth as long as the distortions are kept low by efficient expenditure 
and taxation policies. Apart from the absence of a robust link, the causality be-
tween the per capita income and the size of the public sector is also not clear: does 
higher spending facilitate income growth or does higher income demands greater 
provision of public goods as in those countries with aging populations and greater 
urbanization? 
2. The size of the fiscal deficits typically has a negative bearing on growth. A 
higher fiscal deficit and a rapidly rising debt are commonly associated with mac-
roeconomic instability and directly and indirectly impinge on the saving and in-
vestment decisions of the private sector, and hence growth. Higher government 
borrowing raises the cost of capital and crowds out the private sector. Savings rise 
to guard against future tax increases while investment declines in reaction to lower 
expected future returns on the capital, both constraining growth. In addition, the 
quickest and probably the least politically contentious mean to curb the budget 
deficit is typically through cuts in the capital budget which would also affect fu-
ture growth. The empirical results for the EU countries as well as other countries 
broadly support this negative relationship running from high deficit and public 
debt to growth. In addition to the level of the fiscal deficit, the variability of the 
deficit could also be associated with lower growth: the increased variability of 
discretionary spending would increase output variability and hence output growth. 
3. The composition and efficiency of public expenditure is the most common 
dimension investigated in the fiscal-growth link. The underlying hypothesis is that 
the provision of those public goods that raise the productivity of the factors of 
production and address market imperfections are typically growth-promoting. But 
the link is less robust empirically. The expected positive link between total public 
investment and growth is only detected in some cases, but investment in certain 
areas (for example, transportation and communication) is clearly growth-
enhancing. Public consumption and transfers on the other hand are typically nega-
tively related to growth, but there are clearly elements of current expenditure (edu-
cation, health, and spending on R&D, public safety and order, and environment), 
which are pro growth. The lesson that emerges from the EU experience is that the 
growth benefits the most from a well-targeted public expenditure program, rather 
than in increase in overall public investment. Increasing the efficiency of spending 
at any spending level is likely to contribute to growth. For example, the efficiency 
of spending on education could in many cases be increased by focusing on curricu-Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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lum design, student-teacher ratios, and IT spending rather than by spending on 
brick and mortars, or public spending on R&D is most effective when it spurs 
private R&D. However, measuring expenditure efficiency is a more complex issue 
(see Box 1). 
4. The structure and efficiency of the revenue system is the other side of the fis-
cal equation that impacts growth. In general, the tax system addresses a number of 
public policy objectives: it raises resources to finance the provision of public 
goods and services; reallocates income (progressive income tax); addresses exter-
nalities (fuel and “sin” taxes); and supports specific purposes (tax breaks for hous-
ing). Direct taxes usually have a more discretionary element than indirect taxes 
and hence could be more distortionary and growth inhibiting. Among direct taxes, 
some (e.g., social security taxes) have a more adverse impact on growth (by affect-
ing costs and competiveness) than others (e.g., income taxes). Similarly, some 
indirect taxes (e.g., tariffs and trade taxes) are less growth-friendly than others 
(e.g., VAT). Additionally, the ability of the tax system to support growth depends 
on the structure of the economy and the efficiency of tax administration. In the 
EU, of all taxes, the high tax on labor has probably the most adverse impact on 
growth and employment. The efficiency of the tax system could also affect the 
incidence of taxation: a broader tax base and a more efficient revenue collection 
would allow for lower tax rates. In principle, an optimal tax system would have to 
be simple and transparent; eliminate (or at least minimize) the incentives for tax 
avoidance; and would carry a low administrative and compliance cost. 
 
Box 1. Efficiency of Public Spending 
One of the novelties of the EC study is its discussion of the efficiency of public spending 
and the link between the provision of inputs and the output and ultimate policy objec-
tives. In the education area, for example, the input would be the number of teachers made 
available through the provision of public resources to achieve a certain output in terms of 
the number of graduates or the degree of educational attainment. In addition to public 
spending, there are also a host of other factors that could affect the outcome (for example, 
parents’ educational levels or the extent of family-financed private tutoring). The output, 
in turn, should also be closely linked to the outcome (in this case, higher labor productiv-
ity) and to the ultimate policy objective behind the initial provision of public goods 
(higher GDP growth). Establishing these links empirically, however, faces some impor-
tant hurdles including the definition of inputs and outputs, and the availability of suffi-
ciently detailed data at the country level and comparable data for cross-country compari-
sons. There are also different initial conditions across countries and various leads and 
lags involved between the provision of inputs and the achievement of final output that 
could be different between countries. Notwithstanding the data shortcomings, the study 
discusses efficiency estimates of public spending on education and health in the OECD 
countries. 
 PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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5. Good fiscal governance includes sound fiscal rules and strong fiscal institu-
tions, budgetary procedures and medium-term budget frameworks. These rules, 
procedures and practices could constrain the scope for politically-motivated fiscal 
decisions, attach a more clear outcome to fiscal decisions (performance-based 
budgeting) and better focus the policy discussion on spending priorities. Since 
1990, the tendency in the EU countries has been to adopt fiscal rules, extend the 
coverage of the existing rules or strengthen their features. In general, stronger 
fiscal rules in the EU has been associated with stronger budgetary performance, 
although it is also recognized that rule-based frameworks could weaken the flexi-
bility of fiscal policy to respond to shocks, especially when the monetary policy 
has a limited room to maneuver. At the same time, more and more EU members 
have adopted medium-term budgetary frameworks on an annual rolling basis with 
3-4 years horizons. Such medium-term frameworks provide more transparency, 
facilitate investment decision-making by the private sector, and lessen the scope 
for expenditure surges linked to political cycles. However, even in the EU mem-
bers these frameworks are typically indicative, are not closely linked to the annual 
budgets, and are not subject to enforcement. Some EU countries have instituted 
independent fiscal agencies which supply macro assumptions for budget formula-
tion and in some cases assess and monitor the budget performance, and provide 
medium term budget plans. Finally, performance-based budgeting, linking budget 
appropriations to concrete outcome, is being used, but only in few EU countries 
and only a few sectors. 
6. There are a set of non-fiscal parameters such as market efficiency and the 
business environment that have strong overlaps with the other QPF dimensions 
and affect growth. Such parameters could, for example, reflect the efficiency of 
the goods and labor markets, or the legal and regulatory framework, and their di-
rect and indirect impact on growth. By definition, however, such parameters could 
be assessed only qualitatively and stand the risk of being subjective. A number of 
institutions publish and regularly update such proxies. The World Banks’ Doing 
Business indices provide a proxy for the quality of business regulations and the 
effectiveness of their enforcement. The World Bank also publishes “governance 
indicators” and the World Economic Forum tabulates an index on “wastefulness” 
of government spending. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical foundation of the arguments, establishing an 
empirical link between growth and QPF has proved more difficult in practice for a 
number of reasons. First, while some QPF dimensions are easily quantifiable (e.g., 
public debt, fiscal deficit, share of taxes), other components are only qualitative 
(e.g., relative efficiency, market flexibility, effective governance). Second, there is 
the issue of simultaneity and a causality running in both directions between growth Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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and QPF. Third, the degree of influence of QPF on economic growth is compli-
cated by potentially long lags between policy implications and outcome.  
With these caveats in mind, the data suggests that divergences in growth per-
formance across the EU and non-EU OECD countries since 1980 have been ac-
companied by divergences in QFP. Overall, and generally speaking, countries with 
lower public expenditure to GDP, lower public debt to GDP, lower budget deficit 
to GDP and lower deficit variability, lower share of direct taxes, lower labor tax 
wedge, and more market flexibility have displayed a higher growth tendency. 
Moreover, in the more recent period, the differences in growth performance be-
tween the high and low growth countries have been associated with even sharper 
differences in QPF performance. 
Focusing on the overall GDP growth and trying to link it with the different 
QPF components, however, misses the channels through which growth is more 
readily affected by QPF parameters. The study suggests decomposing the sources 
of growth (through a growth-accounting framework in which low-skill labor, high-
skill labor, capital, and total factor productivity are the contributing factors) and 
then link each of the growth components to the QPF component that would most 
likely influence it. For example, the results suggest that high education attainment 
and more flexible labor market conditions tend to increase the contribution of 
skilled labor to growth. Or that high public debt and less flexible capital markets 
tend to be associated with lower private capital investment impact on growth. 
 
 
2.2.  World Bank Report: “Fiscal Policy for Growth and Development 
 
The World Bank report has a similar premise and essentially touches on the 
same set of issues as the EC report: (a) macro stability is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for growth – fiscal policy should aim at macro stability with 
growth; (b) there is need for a deeper understanding of fiscal-growth linkages, 
focusing on the efficiency and composition of public expenditures and tax struc-
ture; (c) policies should be country-specific, taking into account the countries’ 
stage of economic development and their various constraints and priorities. Within 
this framework, the focus of policies should be to create a “fiscal space”
5 to sup-
port growth and, additionally, consistent with the thrust of World Bank policies, 
the growth should be pro-poor and environmentally sustainable.  
                                                 
5 “Fiscal Space” refers to the government ability to spend without impairing its solvency. 
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Effective pro-growth fiscal policy requires a better recognition of the role of 
the fiscal policy at both the macro and micro levels, of the rules and procedures, 
and of the institutions and governance. In the macro area, there should be a recog-
nition that the speed as well as the composition of fiscal adjustment may impinge 
on growth. Rapid adjustment, often coming at the expense of cuts in capital ex-
penditure and quick revenue mobilization (that would affect private sector deci-
sions) could lower the growth trajectory. With this mind, the fiscal-growth link 
should be viewed within a longer-term framework in order to evaluate inter-
temporal trade-offs. In the micro area, there should be a better recognition of fi-
nancial returns and costs of various expenditure and revenue options. Stronger 
fiscal rules and procedures should limit discretions and provide a longer-term per-
spective to dampen the impact of business cycles on growth. Finally, all these 
efforts would need to be supported by stronger institutions and effective govern-
ance built around greater transparency and accountability. 
A strong macroeconomic footing and fiscal stability are central to a pro-growth 
policy, but ultimately the stronger and the most direct impact of policies on growth 
comes through the growth-content and the efficiency of public spending and taxa-
tion, especially in areas that spur private sector investment and production. Draw-
ing on a number of country studies, the World Bank paper concludes that capital 
expenditure, as well as spending on transport and communication, and health and 
education are typically pro-growth. The effects would be stronger the higher the 
efficiency of resource use and the quality of governance. The effect would be ac-
cumulative over time, and hence the importance of a longer term perspective. The 
empirical evidence also seems to suggest that the causality runs from public ex-
penditure to growth. The report is rather mute on the effect of alternative revenue 
options on growth, save for the general principle that the tax structure should not 
adversely affect private investment decisions. The World Bank, in coordination 
with the International Monetary Fund, has typically advocated a gradual move 
from direct taxes toward indirect taxes, especially broad-based consumption taxes; 
a broadening of the tax base which would allow for lower tax rates; reducing tax 
expenditure; lowering reliance on trade taxes; limiting tax earmarking which could 
limit budget flexibility; and avoiding ad-hoc tax changes that create uncertainty; 
all supported by stronger tax administration and effective enforcement. 
Against this background and observations, the report suggests an explicit 
“growth-oriented approach” to fiscal policy, which is the most innovative contri-
bution of the study. The approach first tries to identify the constraints to higher 
growth and to ascertain whether fiscal policy (public expenditure and taxation) 
could be used to address these constraints. If public spending is judged to be the 
binding constraint, then the question becomes whether compositional changes and 
efficiency gains could alleviate these constraints. And if not, it might be even nec-Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
 
CASE Network Reports No. 94  22 
essary in some cases to raise the level of public spending within a prudent and cost 
effective revenue and financing resource envelope. If compositional shifts, higher 
efficiency or increases in spending levels were deemed insufficient to achieve the 
growth target, the target itself would then have been adjusted. This iterative proc-
ess seeks to ensure that: (a) the fiscal policy is securely anchored within a prudent 
macro framework; (b) potential gains from compositional expenditure shifts and 
efficiency are fully captured; (c) the fiscal contra nits to growth are alleviated and 
ultimately removed; and (d) that the fiscal policy remains consistent with a higher 
long term growth projectile. This approach stands in contrast to the conventional 
approach where initial conservative assumptions about resource availability could 
constrain growth objectives. The approach also allows countries to identify and 
address country-specific constraints to higher growth. Cast in a medium term 
framework, and tapping the full potential of fiscal policy, while staying within 
prudent macro limits, the suggested World Bank approach is more likely to help 
countries achieve the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals which are 
predicated on high and sustained rates of economic growth. 
The paper reports the findings of a number of detailed country studies that draw 
on country specifics to establish the optimal link between the fiscal policy and 
growth objectives
6.
 This “tailor-made” approach leads to some interesting conclu-
sions for the MED countries. It was reported that in some countries (Turkey in-
cluded) a stronger growth impulse would come from improved composition and 
efficiency of expenditure. In other countries (Morocco included), improving the 
efficiency of tax policy would improve the growth orientation of the fiscal policy. 
For the African countries in the sample (Morocco excluded), an increase in the level 
of expenditure, financed by predictable aid, would ease the growth constraints. 
 
 
2.3.  Other Selected Studies on the Growth-Fiscal Link 
 
There have been a number of recent empirical studies investigating the impact 
of changes in the fiscal components on growth in developing countries. The fol-
lowing selected studies provide a flavor of the recent trend in research on the issue 
that might be relevant for the studies on the MED partner countries; in fact, some 
of these studies include the MED countries in their sample coverage. 
                                                 
6 In fact, two of the twelve countries are MED countries (Turkey and Morocco). The other 
countries in the group were: Brazil, Cameroon, Ukraine, India, Kenya, Philippines, Rwan-
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Semmler et al (2007) develop in a theoretical framework of an economy where 
the government taxes optimally and spends on education and health, infrastructure, 
public consumption and transfers, and debt service. The model is calibrated and 
numerical examples are used to explore the impact of shifts in the consumption of 
government spending on long term per capita income and welfare. Since the model 
is not estimated, the results are influenced by the values assigned to different pa-
rameters. Moreover, since the model assumes that taxation is already optimal, the 
fiscal impact on growth only emanates from compositional changes in public 
spending.  
One set of results suggests that the composition of investment expenditure in-
deed matters as the income and welfare gains of moving to an optimal allocation 
of expenditure between infrastructure on the one hand, and health and education 
on the other hand are significant. Based on the calibration exercise, the per capita 
income and welfare gains would be maximized if roughly two third of public in-
vestment is allocated to the development of infrastructure that facilitates market 
production and the remaining one third allocated, equally, to public investment 
that supports health and education. The model also suggests that allocating human 
capital to market production or to more human capital production poses an impor-
tant trade-off and recommends that human capital should be largely used for mar-
ket production. Interestingly, the model also suggests that long term debt sustain-
ability is not an issue as long as resources allocated to public investment are used 
in a growth maximizing manner.  
Moreno-Dodson (2008) explores the impact of changes in public spending on 
growth in a sample of seven fast-growing developing countries
7. Specifically, the 
study seeks to establish the conditions under which public spending contributes to 
growth and identify those spending components that have a stronger and more 
durable impact on growth. The model specifies growth as a function of a set of 
fiscal variables (ratios of expenditure, revenue, deficit to GDP); macroeconomic 
stability variables (inflation); private sector contributions (private investment to 
GDP ratio); and country-specific initial conditions (human capital, degree of 
openness). The model focuses on total expenditure, arguing that the growth con-
tent of some categories of current spending (for example, maintenance) cannot be 
conceptually isolated from investment spending. To investigate the impact of 
                                                 
7 None of the seven countries covered in this study (Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Botswana, and Mauritius) are in the MED partner sample. These countries were 
chosen because their high growth rates had been sustained over many years, allowing suf-
ficient time for policies (in this case fiscal policy) to manifest itself. Also, they were cho-
sen to investigate the reasons for their rapid growth (and whether fiscal related) and draw 
lessons from their experience for the slower growing countries. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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compositional shifts in expenditure on growth, total government spending is di-
vided on the basis of alternative different criteria, driving a wedge between pro-
ductive and unproductive, and between social and economic expenditures. 
The results suggest that the net impact of public spending on growth has been 
positive. Inflation (proxying macro instability) had a negative impact on growth, 
while private investment and the openness of the economy supported growth. The 
growth impact of the composition of public spending was very much a function of 
the definitions. As expected, “productive” expenditure (including education and 
health as well as some economic expenditure such as transport and communica-
tion) had the largest positive impact on growth, particularly over the medium 
term
8. The implication is that social spending is most effective when accompanied 
by increases in certain economic spending; in isolation, economic spending had a 
positive impact on growth whereas social spending was not statistically signifi-
cant. The country results also broadly confirmed the cross-country analysis. In 
brief, the empirical results suggest that public spending has a net positive impact 
on growth if: (a) macroeconomic stability is maintained; (b) the size of the gov-
ernment is relatively small; (c) social and economic spending are mixed in a pro-
ductive cocktail; and (d) are supported by private investment and open foreign 
trade. 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) investigate the impact of public spending on 
health and education. Earlier empirical findings suggest that the level of public 
education spending has little impact on the outcomes, because it ‘crowds out” 
private spending but also because of inherent inefficiencies and weaknesses in 
public service delivery. Extending the framework to include a “governance” vari-
able, Rajkummar and Swaroop find that the differences in the efficacy of public 
spending can be explained largely by the quality of governance. Education and 
health outcomes are substantially better where governance is good, and when the 
governance is poor, these expenditures do not seem to have much of an impact on 
the outcomes. These findings are based, however, on preliminary World Bank 
measures of governance and a short sample period for expenditure and outcome. 
Eken et al (1997) is one of the earliest empirical studies on the impact of fiscal 
policy on growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
9. Similar to 
the studies reviewed above, this study also seeks to determine the impact of the 
level and the composition of public expenditure on growth. However, in contrast 
to these studies, this study also investigates the impact of government revenue on 
                                                 
8 The study finds that reallocating 1% of unproductive spending to productive spending 
would increase GDP per capita growth by 0.35%. 
9 This study provides a good overlap of countries with MED running in an arc from Syria 
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growth in the context of both oil importers and oil exporters
10. The empirical re-
sults were mixed. In the non-oil exporting countries, there was robust evidence on 
the negative impact of both overall expenditure and overall revenue on growth – 
the size of the government argument. However, no robust estimates were obtained 
on the growth impact of the composition of expenditure and revenue, which attrib-
uted to the diversity of the countries in the sample as well the lack of a clear divide 
between productive and unproductive expenditure. In the oil-exporting countries, 
there was some evidence of a positive link between the overall expenditure and 
revenue and non-oil GDP growth. Both current and capital expenditure were posi-
tively correlated with growth. (discussed further below). The overall budget deficit 
was found to have a positive (though statistically insignificant) impact on growth 
in oil-exports while the relation was negative for the non-oil exporters. Similar to 
the previous study, macro instability variables (inflation) had a negative impact on 
growth while private investment exerted a positive influence. 
The MED partner countries include a number of oil and gas exporters: Algeria 
and to a lesser extent, Egypt and Syria. The fiscal mechanism and channels that 
impact growth could be conceptually different between the oil exporters and oil 
importers
11.
 The revenue structure in oil exporters is dominated by oil revenue 
(meant to include revenue from all hydrocarbon recourses); non-oil revenue is 
dominated by non-tax revenue (mostly specific fees and charges on a limited range 
of goods and services, and investment income); and the tax base is very narrow 
(personal and corporate income taxes are low or are nonexistent, import duties are 
low, and there are typically no mass consumption taxes). The narrow revenue base 
and the volatility of oil prices have rendered the public finances of these countries 
particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the oil market. 
In most Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries the governments play a central 
in redistributing the oil income. Most, if not all, of the oil revenue in the MENA 
oil exporting countries accrue in one form or the other to the government. The 
government also has a central role in distributing the oil income to the general 
population through employment; transfers, subsidies and entitlements; public se-
curity and defense; and public development projects. For these reasons, the share 
of total government revenue (including oil revenue) and expenditure in GDP is 
very high in the oil exporting countries. However, with salaries, pensions, subsi-
dies and entitlements, education and defense dominating public spending, the effi-
                                                 
10 Fiscal policy in the oil exporting countries has its own nuances and is further discussed 
below. 
11 This characterization is more typical of the larger Middle East oil exporters. The margi-
nal oil exporters (i.e., Egypt and Syria in the MED sample) have features closer to the oil 
importers. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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ciency of government spending is rather low and the expenditure structure is fairly 
rigid. In these circumstances, the growth impulse largely originates from increases 
in the overall expenditure
12. As such, there has been a strong correlation between 
the oil income, government expenditure levels, and non-oil GDP in the oil export-
ing countries, creating boom-bust cycles that follow the oil price cycles. It is only 
more recently that the proceeds from the investment of the surplus assets have 
emerged as an important expenditure-smoothing element in some countries, help-
ing to dampen expenditure and output gyrations.  
Reducing the vulnerability of the economies of oil exporters to external terms 
of trade shocks requires forward looking policies to diversify the revenue base, 
improve the quality of spending, and reduce certain clearly unproductive spending, 
without significantly changing the welfare-state features that have been in place in 
these countries for some time
13. 
                                                 
12 Eken (1997). 
13 See, Sassanpour (1996) for a discussion of policy challenges in oil exporting countries. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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3. Fiscal Policy and Growth: Some 
Stylized Facts 
The technical description of the general invitation to tender for the present 
study refers to the conceptual framework prepared by the Commission that sets out 
the key channels through which fiscal policy could impact economic growth (see 
Section 2 above). These were identified as (i) size of government, (ii) composition 
and efficiency of public expenditures, (iii) structure and efficiency of revenue 
systems, and (iv) fiscal governance institutions and practices. We will analyze 
these channels in detail throughout the study. Starting in this section we point out 
some important stylized facts. Originally, the intention was to undertake the analy-
sis for all countries included in The Barcelona Process Union for the Mediterra-
nean. However because of data limitations, the coverage was narrower as a num-
ber of countries (Mauritania, Monaco, the Palestinian Authority, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Montenegro) were excluded from the sample. Hence the present 
study is limited to Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, Croatia, and Turkey. 
Table 1 brings together a number of fiscal and other variables for the Mediter-
ranean partner countries of the EU considered in the study. The table provides data 
for the period 1980-2008 and for the sub periods 1980-1995 and 1996-2008 (all 
data sources are listed in the Annex). The data is provided for low growing coun-
tries (with average growth rate below 2% over the sample) and fast growing coun-
tries (with growth rates above 2% over the sample)
14. Data for Israel and Turkey 
are presented separately as for some of the data series they are clearly outliers and 
the analysis discussed below will take that into account in the regression specifica-
tions. The data sources are described in Appendix 1. The governance indicator 
corresponds to the average of six World Bank governance indicators which meas-
ure the country’s performance in terms of voice and accountability, political stabil-
ity; government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
                                                 
14 This classification puts in the group of fast growing countries Albania, Croatia, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; and in the group of low growth Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Sy-
ria. More details on growth rates are given in Table 1. The 2 percent benchmark was cho-
sen because it is the average of the growth experienced by this group of countries over the 
sample. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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ruption (see Box 2). Several stylized facts are worth mentioning. They provide a 
bird’s eye view of the relationships under investigation and will be subjected to 
rigorous analysis in Section 5. 
•  Countries that experience low growth seem to have a somewhat larger 
government as defined by the share of expenditures in GDP; Israel has 
an exceptionally large government sector, while Turkey has a very 
small government sector; 
•  Slow growing countries have a substantial fiscal deficit and a high 
level of debt, while fast growing countries on the other hand operate 
their government with a slight surplus and substantially lower levels 
of debt;. 
•  Productive expenditures make up a are consistently higher share in to-
tal expenditures in fast growing countries than in slow growing coun-
tries; in Israel the non productive expenditures are very high largely 
because of its high defense expenditures; data for Turkey were not 
available; 
•  Domestic consumption taxes raise a larger share of fiscal revenue in fast 
growing countries than in slow growing countries, while the reverse is 
true for taxes on international trade. Income taxes raise a larger share of 
total revenue in slow growing versus fast growing countries. 
•  The average for governance indicators, while still negative for nearly 
all countries included in t his study is less negative in fast growing 
than in slow growing countries; Israel stands as the only country with 
a positive score  
 
Table 1. Growth and the quality of public finances, selected indicators for the Euro-
Med region 
1980-2008 1980-1996 
  low 
growth
high 





growth Israel  Tur-
key 
Average GDP per capita 
growth rate  1.17  3.10 1.98  2.92 0.70  2.01 2.25  2.80 
Inflation,  percent  15.39 30.33  29.78  41.34 25.97 71.64  49.52  46.27 
1. The size of the government 
Government  Expenditure 31.61 29.60  44.19  21.64 30.43 26.86  42.77  15.33 
2. Fiscal deficit and sustainability 
Size  of  deficit  -5.67 2.14  -2.87  -4.41 -6.62 3.91  -3.17  -1.12 
Public  debt  62.81 54.05  56.12  34.18 57.58 43.33  54.83  28.24 
3. Composition of expenditure* 
Productive  36.64 39.95  32.98  --  42.04 38.13  32.99  -- 
Non-productive  63.36 60.05  67.02  --  57.96 61.87  67.01  -- PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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1980-2008 1980-1996 








growth Israel  Tur-
key 
4. Structure of revenues 
Income  taxes  21.51 15.33  32.32 30.06 24.55 14.53  33.08  32.23 
Consumption taxes  21.51  24.50  27.14 43.86 --  17.13  27.40  32.35 
Taxes on External Trade 17.62  10.40  0.83  2.15  29.60  14.53  1.16  3.85 
5. Governance 
Average of governance 
scores*  -0.54 -0.09 0.60  -0.20 --  --  --  -- 
1996-2008 





Average GDP per capita 
growth rate  4.15 1.67  3.05  3.05 
Inflation, percent  3.41  3.96  3.47  34.77
1. The size of the government 
Government Expenditure 32.08  30.41  44.90 24.79
2. Fiscal deficit and sustainability 
Size of deficit  -5.72  1.56  -2.73 -6.06
Public debt  69.81  52.76  56.52 42.09
3. Composition of expenditure* 
Productive 35.51  40.44  32.98 -- 
Non-productive 64.49  59.56  67.02 -- 
4. Structure of revenues 
Income taxes  21.49  8.51  31.95 28.97
Consumption taxes  22.42  26.95  27.02 49.61
Taxes on External Trade 15.64  8.51  0.67  1.30 
5. Governance 
Average of governance 
scores
1  -0.54 -0.09 0.60  -0.20
Notes: * In percent of GDP. 
1 Average of governance scores constructed by the World 
Bank, described in detail in the next section. Weighted averages, using per capita GDP in 
international USD (PPP exchange rates) in 2007 as weights. The panel is unbalanced, not 
all data is available for the whole period. 
 
In Table 2 we show in addition other macroeconomic variables that are tradi-
tionally linked to growth. Countries in the region differ substantially in terms of 
their openness (exports plus imports as a ratio to GDP), and of their foreign direct 
investment inflows as a percent of GDP, and the two variables appear somehow 
correlated. 
To further look into the relationship between size of the government and 
growth, Figure 1 plots for the countries in the sample the average growth rate and 
the average size of Government for 1980-2008. An inspection of the chart shown 
in the figure does not suggest a systematic relationship either way. Countries with Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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large governments – such as Israel with expenditure to GDP ratio of 44 percent – 
have not experienced a slow growth. However, the one country with smaller gov-
ernment than the sample average – Turkey with expenditure to GDP ratio of 22 
percent – did experience a somewhat above average growth rate. In most countries 
in the sample, expenditures represent about 30 percent of GDP yet they experi-
enced substantially different growth rates. Clearly, without taking other factor into 
account, the size of government does not seem to be unambiguously related to 
growth performance. 
 
Table 2. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, ratios to GDP, sample averages (1980-
2008) 
   Openness  Foreign Direct  
Investment* 
Albania 37.2   
Algeria 39.7   
Croatia* 68.6  33.5 
Egypt 29.4  34.4 
Israel 52.9  13.5 
Jordan 75.7  66.9 
Lebanon 50.7   
Morocco 40.6  35.9 
Syria 41.6   
Tunisia 67.6  60.4 
Turkey 5.4  12.8 
Note. * The data on FDI is not available for the whole sample, and data availability differs 
across countries, and is not used in the analysis. 
 
We notice in Table 1 however, that one thing that clearly seems to distinguish 
slow from fast growing countries is the average governance scores. Assuming that 
governance affects the impact of fiscal policy in the economy, we simply multiply 
fiscal expenditures as a ratio to GDP by the average governance scores, to see if 
there seems to be a pattern by re-scaling government expenditures in this way. 
Figure 2 shows the cross-plot of this re-scaled expenditure variable against 
growth, and the correlation seems to change significant. When we control for gov-
ernance it does appear that countries with larger governments and/or more effec-
tive governments do realize a somewhat faster growth. 
To explore further the relationship between the size of government and per cap-
ita growth, and to further analyze the importance of its composition, financing, and 
effectiveness, we apply regression analysis to the panel data, using the methodol-
ogy which we describe in Chapter 4. The results of the analysis are explained in 
Chapter 5. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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Figure 1. Growth and Government Size 
Correlation Between Growth Rates of Real Output Per Capita and Size 
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Figure 2. Growth, Government Size, and Governance 
 
Correlation Between Growth Rates of Real Output Per Capita and Size 
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4. Study Methodology 
 
 
4.1.  Fiscal Policy and Growth Analysis 
 
The hypotheses that we intend to test and for which we define the methodology 
and collect the necessary data are the following: 
•  The size of government by itself is not systematically related to 
growth performance. What matters more is the way the government 
expenditures are financed; 
•  Whatever the impact of the size of government, the composition of 
expenditure affects growth. The larger the share of productive expen-
ditures in overall expenditure, the better the growth performance is 
expected to be. Good governance will enhance this effect; 
•  Revenue systems that rely relatively more on consumption taxes have a 
less negative impact on growth than those that rely more on income 
taxes. But taxes on international depress growth more than domestic 
consumption taxes as they have a greater distortive effect on production. 
We estimate growth equations with fiscal policy variables as part of a compre-
hensive set of explanatory variables. The empirical model is broadly based on the 
methodology of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Bose et al. (2007), and Moreno-
Dodson (2008), adapted to the framework of this study and its data weaknesses. 
The countries included in the panel regression estimates are Albania, Algeria, 
Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. The 
estimation sample is 1996-2008, which is the period for which we have informa-
tion on governance, but not all countries have all the data for this period, hence the 
panel is unbalanced. The data sources are described in the Appendix 1, and the 
data availability in Appendix 2. 
The baseline specification relates the growth rate of per capita GDP to the GDP 
per capita growth rate lagged one period and a range of control variables, which 
can be classified in three broad categories:  
1.  Macroeconomic indicators 
2.  Initial conditioning variables 
3.  Fiscal policy variables 
This specification can then be summarized as follow: PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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  01 12 3 4 15 16 '' it it it i it it it yy X I C G T S α αα α α αα −− − = ++ + + ++ , (1) 
 
where α1 to α6 contain the coefficients assigned to the independent variables, and 
α0 is a constant; the subscript i indexes the country; the subscript t indexes the 
year; y is the rate of growth of GDP per capita; X is a vector of macroeconomic 
indicators; IC is a vector of initial conditioning variables; G is the ratio of gov-
ernment expenditure to GDP; T is the ratio of government revenues to GDP; and S 
is a vector of fiscal sustainability indicators. 
The lagged value of the dependent variable is included to capture cyclical ef-
fects. Since we have a limited time series for each country, it is not possible to net 
out cyclical effects by taking 5 or 10 year averages.  
In the set of control variables representing macroeconomic conditions (X vec-
tor) we have included: a measure of openness (imports plus exports divided by 
GDP) to capture the various benefits that are related to openness such as those that 
are responsible for the success of export-led growth, increased competitiveness 
that result from lower protection and economies of scale, as well as the attractive-
ness of the country for FDI and related access to modern technology. The latter 
could not be taken into account directly for lack of comparable data. Also included 
is the CPI inflation rate as a measure of the degree of macroeconomic instability 
(as proposed in Moreno-Dodson, 2008). The coefficient associated with openness 
is expected to be positive and the coefficient on inflation to be negative. 
As initial condition variables (IC vector) we only included the log of GDP per 
capita in the initial year since other variables considered in the literature, such as 
life expectancy at birth and school enrolment, were not statistically significant. To 
the extent that this variable captures the initial stock of human capital, the coeffi-
cient is expected to be positive. 
In the set of fiscal policy variables we include the first lag of government ex-
penditures to GDP ratio to account for the size of the government. We also include 
the first lag of the revenues to GDP ratio to control for the way fiscal policy is 
financed. There is a large body of literature that shows that balanced-budget fiscal 
expansions should have a different impact on output than debt-financed fiscal ex-
pansions (see Perotti, 2007, and references therein). 
The expenditures and revenues are lagged by one period to account for fiscal 
policy lags, and for possible endogeneity problems (that arise if higher growth 
leads to higher expenditure. We could not consider more lags, given our short time 
series. If large governments are less conducive to growth, the coefficient on gov-
ernment expenditures should come out negative. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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Finally, as indicator of the sustainability of fiscal policy we consider the debt-
to-GDP ratio. The coefficient of the debt variable should be negative, as large debt 
to GDP could signal higher interest rates, tighter access to finance, and the crowd-
ing out of private investment. 
In alternative specifications we extended the model to account for the impact of 
governance. Previous studies have argued that governance can change the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policy (see Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002)
15.
 At the same time, 
the growth literature has stressed the importance of accounting for the quality of 
inputs, and therefore measuring inputs, such as labour in efficiency units (see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, for instance). We do not have a direct measure of 
government efficiency, with which to scale government expenditures, but we as-
sume that government efficiency is correlated with a set of governance indicators, 
and we re-scale government expenditures according to efficiency using this as-
sumption. 
The governance indicators we use to capture efficiency are the six world gov-
ernance indexes constructed by the World Bank, which measure how each country 
scores in terms of (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability; (iii) govern-
ment effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law; and (vi) control of cor-
ruption (see Appendix 2, for a summary of the data). Box 2 gives a description of 
these governance indexes
16. Since these indicators range in practice between -2.5 
and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes, we choose to take as 
our efficiency scaling factor, the exponential of the average of these scores: coun-
tries with a negative average governance score will have an efficiency scaling 
factor lower than 1, and countries with a positive average governance score will 
have a scaling factor above 1. In this way we obtain a similar re-scaling of expen-
ditures to that of Figure 1, but avoiding dealing with negative numbers. As such 
scaled expenditures are defined as the exponential of the average of the individual 
governance scores.  
We test two alternative specifications regarding the role of governance: (i) 
governance affects growth directly (equation 2) and (ii) governance affects growth 
by changing the effectiveness of fiscal variables. In the second specification (equa-
tion 3), replace government expenditures by our re-scaled variable. 
 
  01 12 3 4 15 16 7 '' it it it i it it it it yy X I C G T S e w g i α αα α α αα α −− − =+ + + + + + + , (2) 
                                                 
15 Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) show that the effectiveness of fiscal expenditures is cor-
related with governance measures. 
16 Between 1996 and 2002, the indexes are available every other year, hence the values for 
1997, 1999, and 2001 have been interpolated. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 94  35 
  01 12 3 4 1 5 16 '' it it it i it it it it yy X I C G e w g i T S α αα α α αα −− − =+ + + + × + + . (3) 
 
In the first specification (2) theory predicts that the coefficient associated with 
governance (α7) should be positive; better governance is more conducive to a bet-
ter environment for the private sector to operate and therefore leads to higher 
growth. 
The second specification (3) implies that the marginal impact of a change of 1 
percent in the expenditure to GDP ratio in country i, in period t, ceteris paribus, 
will be different across countries and equal to α4 x ewgiit ; therefore, fiscal policy 
will have a more positive (or less negative) effect in countries that score better in 
terms of governance and vice versa. 
We also estimate equation (3) substituting the time-varying ewgi for each 
country by its average over the period, and alternatively we estimate equation (1) 
extended with an interaction term Gt-1xDgov, where Dgov takes the value 1 for 
countries with positive governance scores, and zero otherwise. Both these alterna-
tive specifications lose information in terms of changes in governance. The 
dummy specification in addition implies an arbitrary grouping of countries. We 
test these specifications in order to identify possible problems associated with the 
interaction of two time-varying variables in the regression, but they yield broadly 
the same results and are reported in the Appendix B
17. 
 
Box 1. Governance Indicators 
As of 1996 the World Bank has constructed aggregate governance indicators that com-
bine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries. The individual data sources underlying the aggregate 
indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. 
Governance is defined broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, moni-
tored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and imple-
ment sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that gov-
ern economic and social interactions among them. The six dimensions of governance 
corresponding to this definition that we measure are: 
1.  Voice and Accountability – measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
                                                 
17 Aitken and (1991) describe possible problems with dynamic interactions in regression 
analysis, but these apply mostly to regressions where interactions are included together 
with the variables themselves in the regressions, while here we are simply re-scaling one 
variable. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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2.  Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) – measuring perceptions of the like-
lihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
3.  Government Effectiveness – measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
4.  Regulatory Quality – measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to for-
mulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote pri-
vate sector development. 
5.  Rule of Law – measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforce-
ment, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. 
6.  Control of Corruption – measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
In brief, the methodology consists of identifying many individual sources of data on gov-
ernance perceptions that can be assigned to these six broad categories. The statistical 
methodology known as an unobserved components model to construct aggregate indica-
tors from these individual measures is then applied. These aggregate indicators are 
weighted averages of the underlying data, with weights reflecting the precision of the 
individual data sources.  
Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo,Governance Matters 
VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007(June 24, 2008). World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148386. 
 
Another extension to the model looks at the composition of government expendi-
ture by disaggregating the data into “productive” and “unproductive” expenditures. 
We looked into disaggregating the expenditure data into investment and recurrent 
expenditure. However this distinction, even though appealing at first, was rejected as 
it ran into serious definitional and data availability problems. First, data on invest-
ment expenditures as compiled for administrative purposes in national budgets, 
where available, includes substantial amounts of recurrent expenditures. Secondly, 
since 2000 the IMF GFS system asked Member states to classify their investment 
expenditures into their functional categories. Many countries found this rather cum-
bersome and have stopped providing their functional expenditure classification. As 
such the often made recommendation to “increase investment expenditure to foster 
growth” cannot be tested within the confines of this study. Such a recommendation 
may be valid for individual countries where decision making can benefit from the 
detailed composition of expenditures classified as “recurrent” and “investment” and 
the recommendation refers to subcategories in the “investment” category. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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As an alternative this study defines “productive” expenditure as the sum of ex-
penditure on economic affairs, agricultural affairs, mining, manufacturing, and 
construction, transport, communication, housing, health, education, and environ-
mental protection. “Unproductive” expenditures are defined to include general 
public services, public debt, transfers between levels, defense, public order, fuel 
and energy, and social protection
18. The sign of the coefficient associated with 
productive expenditures is expected to be positive, while the sign of the coefficient 
associated with unproductive expenditures is expected to be negative, or at least 
insignificant. This alternative definition of expenditure is somewhat arbitrary as it 
is likely that some expenditure classified as productive still can in fact be unpro-
ductive. The estimated coefficients described in the next section provide a test to 
this classification, and do show some evidence that it seems to be approximately 
correct. Nevertheless, obtaining a more refined classification could constitute an 
issue for further research. 
In addition we look at the impact of fiscal revenues disaggregated between in-
come taxes, consumption taxes, and external trade taxes. The prior is that income 
taxes should have a stronger negative impact on growth than consumption taxes, 
which are generally perceived as less distortionary. The impact of external trade 
taxes is particularly interesting to measure, because according to Table 1, low-
growth countries seem to rely on this type of taxes significantly more than high 
growth countries and theory suggest that because of their protective role, they 
promote misallocation of resources and undermine growth. 
We also tested the significance of regional dummy variables (Balkans, 
Maghreb, Mashrek), and an oil dummy (Algeria, Egypt, and Syria) to capture the 
common features of the country groups, but these classifications did not seem 
significant. We did however estimate a number of regressions using dummies for 
Israel and for Turkey which for a number of variables are outliers. Israel is the 
most industrialized country in the sample, but scores poorly in terms of political 
stability and violence, and has a relatively large share of non-productive expendi-
tures (mostly on defense). Turkey has had an above average performance in terms 
of growth, while having high inflation through most of the sample.  
The regressions are estimated using panel OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), with 
panel corrected standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity and contemporane-
ous correlation of residuals across panels and these are reported in the text.
19 We 
also ran the same set of regressions using panel GLS (Generalized Least Squares), 
controlling for panel hereroscedasticity, and again the same set of regressions con-
                                                 
18 We consider “fuel and energy” expenditures as non-productive since in this region most 
of such spending is on subsidies and transfers. 
19 The standard errors are corrected using the Beck and Katz (1995) procedure. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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trolling for AR(1) autocorrelation in the residuals, but the results did not change 
substantially and were not reported but are available from the authors. 
We tested the significance of regional dummy variables (Balkans, Maghreb, 
Mashrek), and an oil dummy (Algeria, Egypt, and Syria), but these classifications 
do not seem significant. 
 
 
4.2.  Quality of Budget expenditures 
 
The hypothesis we are testing and for which we define the methodology and 
collect data is: 
Expenditures on education and health have a positive impact on educational 
and health achievements, more so in countries that score high on governance and 
much less for countries that score lower. 
To analyze the effectiveness of specific budget expenditure on their policy ob-
jectives we focused on expenditures in education and health. Out attempt to use as 
a reference group the Low and Middle Income Countries (a classification found in 
the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank), to evaluate 
countries outcomes was not successful as the necessary data to undertake this 
analysis were lacking. 
To understand the correlation between expenditures and outcomes in education 
and health we have estimated the following panel data regressions: 
 
  01 2 3 ln
j j
it t it Outcome IC t G αα α α =+ + + , (4) 
 
where Outcome
j is the variable that measures the country’s performance in the 
sector j; α0 is a constant; α1 is the coefficient associated with initial conditions, 
captured here by the log of GDP per capita in the initial year; α2 is the coefficient 
associated with a time trend, included to capture other factors not explicitly taken 
into account; and α3 is the coefficient associated with the ratio of government ex-
penditures to GDP in sector j. We also looked at an alternative specification in 
which governance affects growth either directly or indirectly through a re-scaled 
measure of expenditures 
j
it G ×ewgit. 
In the education sector, we considered as outcome the variable net enrolment in 
secondary education, since it was the one with the longest time series span. Even 
so, the series is of poor quality since it has many gaps that vary across countries 
(see Appendix 2 for a description of the data availability) and it was not possible PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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to find a satisfactory method of interpolation for this series. The interpretation of 
the results from this analysis should have these problems in mind. 
In the health sector, we considered the variables life expectancy at birth, and 
under-5 infant mortality also due to data availability
20. As governance indicators, 
we tested each of the world governance indexes in our database as well as their 
average. The expenditure data is the IMF’s GFS data on expenditures on education 
and health. For secondary education we also used the World Bank data on per 
student expenditure on secondary education. However, the time span in short for 
several countries and did not yield significant results, so we used this data only on 
cross-plot analysis in which we only take into account averages over the sample. 
Notice that when we re-scaled expenditures, the marginal effect of a one per-
cent of GDP increase in “raw” expenditures, ceteris paribus, will be given by α3 x 
ewgiit. Therefore, if α3 is positive, expenditures will have a more positive (or less 
negative) effect in countries with higher governance scores. Notice that if we look 
at a negative outcome, such as under-5 mortality rates, we would expect the coef-
ficient α3 to be negative. 
 
Box 2. PISA scores 
PISA is an OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). It a stan-
dardized assessment, jointly developed by participating countries to be administered 
to15-year-olds in schools. PISA assesses the abilities of students near the end of compul-
sory education in the areas of reading, mathematical, and scientific literacy.  
The survey was implemented in 43 countries in the 1st assessment in 2000, in 41 coun-
tries in the 2nd assessment in 2003, in 57 countries in the 3rd assessment in 2006 and 62 
countries have signed up to participate in the 4th assessment in 2009. 
Tests are typically administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students in each country. 
In our sample we have PISA scores for Albania, Croatia, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, and 
Turkey, but not for all three survey years. 
 
The regressions were estimated using panel OLS. Since long time series data 
on other and perhaps more informative outcome data are not available we have 
also analyzed cross-plots correlating them with average expenditures. In the edu-
cation sector, we looked at the cross-plot between average PISA scores (see Box 
3) in mathematics and science and average public expenditure per student in sec-
ondary education in percent of per capita GDP over the sample. In the health sec-
tor we looked at the cross-plot between average maternal mortality ratios and av-
erage expenditures in health over the sample. 
                                                 
20 Between 1980 and 2005, the series of under-5 mortality rates has values for every five 
years only. We have interpolated the series to obtain annual data. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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5. Quality of Public Finance in the 
Mediterranean Partners of the 
EU Countries: Analysis 
This section will summarize separately the study’s findings on impact on 
growth from: (i) size of Government and the way it is financed, (ii) composition of 
expenditures and growth, (iii) composition of budget revenue and growth, and (iv) 
quality of expenditure: health and education, using the methodology proposed in 
the previous chapter. Each subsection will position a hypothesis that will be tested 
drawing on the data for the sample countries. This study will focus on providing 
and commenting on the results of the regression analysis. The economic rationale 
for the analysis is thoroughly discussed and clearly detailed in the EC study on 
Public Finance in EMU-2008 (Part III and IV). 
 
 
5.1.  Size of Government and the way it is financed 
 
Following the methodology proposed in Chapter 4, we investigate the relation-
ship between growth and size of government (controlling for a range of other fac-
tors) using regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 3. As the stylized 
facts of Chapter 3 suggested, but now in a more rigorous manner, the results show 
that the size of government is only significantly related to growth when the impact 
of governance on government expenditures is taken into account. In addition, it 
emerges from the analysis that the degree of openness of the economy is positively 
related to growth while the level of inflation and debt is negatively related to 
growth. Column (1) in Table 3 provides the results of the baseline specification 
given in equation (1). Only the coefficient for the debt variable shows any signifi-
cance and has the expected sign. Debt reflects the accumulation of past levels of 
expenditure that could not be financed through budgetary revenues. Its level nega-
tively impacts growth because higher levels of debt tend to lead to higher interest 
rates and thus increasing the financing costs for the private sector. Also a high 
level of debt creates uncertainties about the future of the economy and creates PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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expectations that the level of taxation will increase to finance future debt service, 
both depressing private sector activities. The openness and inflation variables have 
the expected sign but the coefficients are not significant even at the 10% level. 
 
Table 3. Fiscal Policy and Growth – Results from panel data regressions of per capita 
growth rates on fiscal policy variables and a range of control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.181 -0.243 -0.236 -0.319 -0.302 -0.302  Real per capita 
growth rate(-1)  [1.205] [1.749]*  [1.695]*  [2.155]** [2.143]** [2.149]** 
0.022 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.028 0.026  Openness 
[1.153] [1.582]  [1.996]** [1.717]* [1.951]* [1.834]* 
-0.044 -0.111 -0.117 -0.118 -0.119 -0.117  Inflation 
[1.113] [2.107]** [2.270]** [2.506]** [2.389]** [2.384]** 
-0.026 0.239 0.228 0.419 0.380 0.380  Log (initial per 
capita real gdp)  [0.161] [1.814]*  [1.653]*  [2.926]*** [2.765]*** [2.792]*** 
-0.019 0.122 0.120 0.045      Expenditures/ 
GDP(-1)  [0.288] [1.299] [1.276] [0.486]     
     0.116  0.112  Expenditures/ 
GDP(-1)*ewgi       [3.145]***  [3.840]*** 
-0.007 0.048    -0.036 -0.015    Revenues/ 
GDP(-1)  [0.121]  [0.983]  [0.582]  [0.276]  
-0.054 -0.067 -0.068 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075  Debt/GDP 
[2.894]*** [4.183]*** [4.204]*** [4.740]*** [4.637]*** [4.902]*** 
    4.819     ewgi 
    [2.861]***   
6.656 -0.886 0.130 -1.195 1.108 0.857  Constant 
[3.987]*** [0.342] [0.055] [0.547] [0.761] [0.678] 
  -4.619 -3.886 -7.423 -8.717 -8.701  Dummy Israel 
 [2.694]*** [2.336]** [4.654]*** [4.703]*** [4.761]*** 
  5.500 5.659 4.751 5.115 5.104  Dummy Turkey  
   [2.279]** [2.309]** [2.093]** [2.218]**  [2.206]** 
Observations  108 108 108 108 108 108 
Number of coun-
try  10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared  0.157 0.277 0.271 0.330 0.323 0.323 
Chi  squ.  18.362  42.198  41.312 79.05 67.282  66.044 
Prob > Chi squ.  0.010  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0000  0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The control variables include macroeconomic indicators (the openness ration and the 
rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita gdp in 1980); and a governance in-
dictor (the average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the ratio 
of government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), G/GDP(-1), the ratio of total reve-
nues to GDP (lagged one period), and the debt to GDP ratio. A variable capturing the ef-
fect of government expenditures re-scaled by governance Expenditures/GDP(-1)*ewgi is 
also considered. The sample is unbalanced and includes observations form 1996-2008. 
Algeria is excluded due to few observation towards the end of the sample. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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Other specifications of this baseline equation were attempted and are reported 
in Table 3. 
In column (2) we add dummies for Israel, and Turkey, which are outliers. Tur-
key has experienced exceptionally high inflation rates over the observation period 
and Israel has a very large government. These dummies are both significant, and 
improve the explanatory power of the regression. Inflation becomes now signifi-
cant with the desired sign. In column (3) we exclude revenues, but this does not 
significantly affect the conclusions regarding the effect of government expendi-
tures. The per capita income growth of previous year also becomes significant, 
with a negative sign. This variable suggests that the rate of growth of per capita 
income in any given years trend to return to an average. For instance, if in any 
given year the per capita growth is above trend (e.g. Morocco experienced favor-
able rainfall that boosted its growth rate) the rate of growth for the successive year 
will tend to drop to a trend value. 
Noteworthy is that when the direct effect of the governance factor on growth is 
taken into account (column 4), its coefficient becomes very significant. We also 
tested the alternative specification (equation 3, in Chapter 4) in which governance 
affects growth through its impact on the effectiveness of public spending, by con-
sidering instead the efficiency scaled measure of expenditures (Expenditures/GDP 
(-1)*ewgi)
21. This variable (column 5) is statistically significant and has a positive 
sign, meaning that an increase in government expenditure will increase growth by 
more in countries with good governance. In column 5 we drop the revenues from 
the equation and the results remain largely unchanged. 
It is also worth noting that when we control for governance, either directly or 
indirectly, the statistical significance of other variables increases. In particular, the 
coefficient on openness becomes significant and with the expected sign, while that 
on inflation remains significant and with the expected sign.  
Conclusion: The size of Government (proxied by the share of government ex-
penditure in GDP) all by itself is not systematically related to growth. However, 
when governance is taken into account the size of government is positively related 
to growth: governments expenditures increase growth in countries with good gov-
ernance, but depresses growth in countries with negative scores on governance. 
Openness, inflation, and the level of debt variables also yield significant coeffi-
cients. A sound fiscal policy and a good macroeconomic environment matter for 
growth. This finding is similar to the one obtained in the Public Finance in EMU 
                                                 
21 The variable ewgit is time dependent and is equal to the exponential of the average of the 
country’s six governance scores in period t. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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2008, which suggests that when governments resort unsustainably to deficit and 
debt financing, the growth performance suffers. 
 
 
5.2.  Composition of Government Expenditures and Growth 
 
All government expenditure fulfills an objective. Some expenditure is under-
taken to provide public goods defined as goods whose inherent qualities require 
public provision (goods that are non rival in consumption and exclusion is inappli-
cable) and merit goods that can be provided by the private sector, but because of 
their characteristics are considered so meritorious that they are provided by the 
public sector above what the private sector would supply
22. These are goods for 
which the social benefit is above the private benefit due to positive externalities, 
hence they are underprovided if financed only privately. Both contain some politi-
cally motivates expenditures. Some expenditure is needed to permit social and 
economic activity to take place particularly defense expenditure and expenditure 
on law and order. Other expenditure enhances the productive capacity of the econ-
omy. Still other expenditure is undertaken for social and distributive reasons. It is 
therefore clear that this categorization cannot be drawn upon to classify neatly and 
unambiguously the expenditures as productive and unproductive. Yet it is intui-
tively clear that some expenditure is likely to improve the growth performance of 
the economy, while other expenditure aims at achieving other objectives. 
This study uses the IMF’s GFS functional classification of government expen-
diture to identify some expenditure as “productive” and some as “unproductive” 
(see Annex 1 for details). To analyze the relationship between growth and the 
composition of exxpenditure we substitute government expenditures in the regres-
sion analysis by “productive” and “unproductive” expenditures (as a ratio to GDP 
and lagged by one period). It is important to stress that the quality of the GFS data 
leaves somewhat to be desired; for some countries not all the categories are re-
ported, and sometimes not for every period. Turkey has no detailed functional 
expenditure breakdown and had to be excluded in this part of the analysis. 
From the analysis reflected in Table 4 it appears that unproductive expenditure is 
unrelated to the growth performance, while productive expenditure enhances it. The 
estimated impact of productive expenditures on growth hides however important 
differences in the effect of expenditures across the governance scale, which are 
tested when we substitute productive expenditures by an efficiency-scaled measure 
                                                 
22 See Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1959,pp. 6-13. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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of expenditures. The openness variable is significant in all regressions; and the infla-
tion coefficient is significant as well in all regressions and has the correct sign. 
 
Table 4. Composition of Fiscal Policy and Growth - Results from panel data regressions 
of per capita growth rates on fiscal policy variables and a range of control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.395 -0.384 -0.383 -0.432 -0.439 -0.579  Per capita 
growth rate (-1)  [2.711]*** [2.680]*** [2.617]*** [2.971]*** [3.087]*** [5.214]*** 
0.049 0.062 0.069 0.050 0.065 0.090  Openness 
[2.404]** [3.203]*** [3.790]*** [2.913]*** [2.925]*** [4.706]*** 
-0.334 -0.353 -0.334 -0.352 -0.406 -0.610  Inflation 
[2.673]*** [2.846]*** [2.642]*** [2.739]*** [3.127]*** [5.728]*** 
0.522 0.562 0.692 0.693 0.743 0.727  Log(initial per 
capita real gdp)  [3.612]*** [3.795]*** [4.671]*** [5.473]*** [4.985]*** [4.973]*** 
0.090  0.078       Unproductive 
Exp./GDP (-1)  [1.636]  [1.436]      
0.223  0.253  0.249      Productive 
Exp./GDP (-1)  [2.057]**  [2.213]** [2.081]**    
      0.220 0.280 0.395  Productive 
Exp./GDP(-1)* 
ewgi      [3.677]*** [3.721]*** [6.389]*** 
0.064        Revenues/ 
GDP (-1)  [ 1 . 2 0 3 ]        
     -0.083    Tax Revenues/ 
GDP (-1)       [1.482]   
      - 1 . 0 1 1   Income Taxes/ 
GDP (-1)        [4.267]*** 
      - 0 . 3 0 9   Consumption 
Taxes/GDP(-1)        [2.952]*** 
      - 0 . 5 7 3   Taxes on Exter-
nal Trade/ 
GDP(-1)        [2.673]*** 
-0.114 -0.117 -0.114 -0.111 -0.118 -0.172  Debt/GDP  
[6.971]*** [7.209]*** [7.058]*** [6.553]*** [5.948]*** [7.211]*** 
-1.792 -1.009  -1.104 0.647 2.691 8.989  Constant 
[0.664] [0.422] [0.410] [0.363] [1.405]  [3.173]*** 
-6.049 -5.187 -4.373 -7.798 -7.441 -2.192  Dummy Israel 
[3.879]*** [4.342]*** [4.369]*** [5.657]*** [5.772]*** [1.160] 
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 68 
Number of 
country  9 9 9 9 9 8 
R-squared  0.467 0.458 0.434 0.487 0.507 0.632 
Chi  squ.  104.497  90.131  96.714  101.181 117.657 170.417 
Prob  >  Chi  squ.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The control variables include macroeconomic indicators (the openness ration and the PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita GDP in 1980); and a governance 
indictor (the average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the 
ratio of unproductive government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), Unproductive 
Exp/GDP(-1); the ratio of productive government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), 
Productive Exp/GDP(-1); the ratio of total revenues to GDP (lagged one period), and the 
debt to GDP ratio. A variable capturing the effect of government expenditures re-scaled by 
governance Productive Exp./GDP (-1)*ewgi is also considered. The sample is unbalanced 
and includes observations form 1996-2008. Algeria is excluded due to few observations 
towards the end of the sample. Turkey is excluded from lack of comparable data, and data 
on tax composition could not be found for Syria. 
 
In column (1) unproductive expenditures have an insignificant coefficient, 
while the coefficient on productive expenditures is positive and significant. These 
estimates provide a test on the classification of expenditures, and our classification 
passes this test. Noteworthy is that any regression that included the governance 
variable gains considerably in explanatory value as measured by R square. For 
instance R square increases from 43 percent in equation (3) to 48-63 percent in 
columns (4)-(6). The variable capturing the effect of efficiency-scaled productive 
expenditures has always a positive and statistically significant sign, suggesting 
that the impact of productive expenditures on growth is higher in countries with 
high governance scores and lower in countries with low governance scores. 
Based on the results of regressions reported in Table 4 columns 4 and 6 a simu-
lation was undertaken on the impact of a 1 percentage point of GDP shift of non-
productive expenditures to productive expenditures on the real per capita growth 
rate, given the average governance score of the country over the sample (every-
thing else constant). Although these results should be interpreted with caution 
since we do not have an exact measure of government expenditure efficiency, they 
give an idea of the differences in the impact of expenditures across the governance 
spectrum. These results are reflected in Table 5, and suggest that those countries 
with the best governance scores would benefit significantly (Israel would gain 
between .37 and.56 percent in annual per capita income growth). On the other 
hand, countries with low governance scores would gain the least (namely Syria 
and Algeria). This finding is particularly important for countries that rely heavily 
on food and energy subsidies. Reducing these subsidies and channeling these 
funds towards productive expenditures would boost growth. 
In Table 6 we simulate instead the effect on per capita real growth rates of 
bringing the governance score up to the regional average, for countries that score 
below the average or to the highest score of the region (Israel), for countries that 
score above the average. All countries, could experience greater per capita growth 
by improving their governance indicator. For the countries with below average 
governance scores the estimates range from about 0.4-0.8 percentage point in the Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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case of Albania to 1.5-2.7 in the case of Syria. For countries with above average 
scores there appears still significant potential to accelerate per capita growth by 
bringing up their score to the level of Israel. For example Tunisia could gain be-
tween 3.4 percent and 6 percent. Given the power of compound growth rates, these 
results suggest that improving the governance score could make a big difference in 
reducing poverty in the region.  
 
Table 5. Simulation of the effect of a 1 percent of GDP shift in the composition of 
expenditure on per capita growth 
Assuming model (Table 4):  (4)  (6) 
Albania 0.13  0.24 
Algeria 0.08  0.15 
Croatia 0.27  0.48 
Egypt 0.14  0.25 
Israel 0.40  0.72 
Jordan 0.23  0.41 
Lebanon 0.15  0.26 
Morocco 0.19  0.34 
Syria 0.09  0.17 
Tunisia 0.23  0.41 
Turkey 0.18  0.33 
Region Average  0.19  0.34 
Region Average Excluding Israel  0.17  0.30 
Note. Governance is held constant in the simulation. 
 
Table 6. Simulation of the effect of improving governance scores on per capita growth 
  (4) (6) 
Countries scoring below the regional average 
Albania 0.45  0.82 
Algeria 1.32  2.38 
Egypt 0.63  1.14 
Lebanon 0.51  0.92 
Syria 1.49  2.69 
Countries scoring above the regional average 
Croatia 1.92  3.45 
Jordan 2.38  4.28 
Morocco 2.39  4.29 
Tunisia 3.37  6.05 
Note. Israel is excluded because it is used as a benchmark for countries that score above 
the regional average. 
 
Conclusion: The composition of government expenditure does matter for 
growth with productive expenditures contributing positively and unambiguously to 
growth. Further, the impact would be enhanced by good governance and weakened PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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by lower governance performance. A shift from non-productive to productive ex-
penditures would enhance growth, particularly for those countries with good gov-




5.3.  Composition of budget revenue and growth 
 
Government revenues and taxation in aggregate do not appear to be signifi-
cantly related to growth performances (Tables 5, and Table 6). In Table 4: the 
coefficient of taxation is as expected negative but not statistically significant (col-
umn 5). However when the regression is specified with domestic consumption 
taxes, taxes on external trade, and income taxes separately the results are most 
interesting. The results are also shown in Table 4 (column 6). The signs remain 
negative, as we would expect, but the coefficient become all statistically signifi-
cant. Most interestingly, income taxes have the most negative estimated impact. 
According to the estimated coefficients, a tax reform that would partially replace 
income taxes for consumption taxes would improve growth. In fact, growth for the 
countries in the sample could on average be increased by 0.7 per cent, if the 
equivalent of one percent of GDP were raised by domestic consumption taxes 
rather than by income taxes (taking into account the coefficients estimated in col-
umn 6). The reason for this outcome is that consumption taxes interfere less with 
labor participation and labor incentives than income taxes. The taxation rate could 
also be lower as the base is larger. Also the complexity of tax regimes is usually 
higher for income taxes than for consumption taxes, hence the former entail higher 
compliance costs for the taxpayer, adding to their negative impact on growth. In 
addition, the results show that taxes on external trade also seem to have a more 
negative effect on growth than consumption taxes. Reducing the reliance on these 
taxes towards domestic consumption taxes would also benefit growth. This sug-
gests that these countries can have a lot to benefit from bilateral or multilateral 
agreements to reduce tariffs with a concomitant effort to raise revenues through 
domestic consumption taxes. 
Conclusion: The composition of revenues does have an impact on the growth 
performance, providing additional support for tax reforms aimed at enhancing the 
role of consumption taxes and relying less on external trade taxes and direct in-
come taxes. It should be noted though that the growth objective is not the only 
objective of tax policy which also has distributional and equity aspects. Yet, this 
analysis permits us to roughly estimate how the growth performance is likely to be Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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affected by implementing other tax policy objectives that would argue to retain or 
to increase the share of revenues from direct taxes. 
 
 
5.4.  Quality of Expenditures: Education and Health 
 
Traditionally, budgetary funds allocated to particular sectors – such as infra-
structure, health, education and defense – have been viewed as a measure of gov-
ernment‘s efforts to achieve the objectives set out for these sectors. More recently, 
however, the focus of analyzing government spending has shifted towards assess-
ing what these expenditures actually achieve and whether they achieve it effi-
ciently. In this effort a distinction needs to be made between (i) funding : the re-
sources spent by especially designated government departments and recorded in 
expenditure statistics, (ii) inputs: the units of specialized resources that these funds 
finance (teachers, nurses, bulldozers, engineers deployed), (iii) output: which re-
fers to what is being achieved (students taught, such hospitalized, roads build ) and 
(iv) outcomes that refers to the ultimate objectives for which the expenditures 
were undertaken such as, in education, useful knowledge gained by students that 
were taught in the system as well as their employability; in health, prolonged life 
expectancy; in infrastructure, reduced transport costs
23. These considerations are at 
the core of the performance budgeting exercise and the currently active “budgeting 
for results” debate
24. Perfect data to analyze this input-output-outcome relationship 
are hardly ever available, yet the focus on the above mentioned relationships 
would enable the authorities to pursue evidence-based policies. 
Data availability does, however, restrict the analysis and often the need arises 
to use proxies for the output and outcome data. Budgetary data are not always 
available to track funds destined to specific objectives, and even when data on 
these funds are available they frequently refer to budgeted funds and not to funds 
actually spent. Other data to track the above noted production function rarely exist 
in the desired format and frequency. This study had initially sought to analyze the 
efficiency of spending on infrastructure, education and health. However, attempts 
to relate budgetary spending on infrastructure or communication to the quality of 
the road infrastructure (as reported by the World Economic Forum) were not suc-
cessful. Instead, the present study focuses on the efficiency of health and educa-
tion expenditure. 
                                                 
23 Public Finance in EMU in 2008, European Commission 2008, p. 141. 
24 Donald Moynehan (2003), Performance Based Budgeting; Beyond the Rhetoric, PREM 
Note # 78, World Bank, Washington DC.  PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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Education 
 
Government spending on education has as its main objective to assist its citi-
zens to achieve their fullest human potential. In the process these citizens are ex-
pected to become more productive members of society and as such contribute to 
the growth of the economy. These outcome data are not available on a comparable 
basis for the countries in the sample. Hence the analysis had to downscale its ob-
jectives and relate a broad category of expenditure to more narrow output indica-
tors. Country specific studies could draw on more pertinent sets of data. Because 
of data limitation for the sample of countries the study chosen to relate per capita 
spending on secondary education and general spending on education as a percent 
of GDP to net enrollment in secondary education – clearly an output rather than an 
outcome – and to PISA scores for science and mathematics (see Box 3). Data on 
net enrollment in secondary education are available for eight of countries in the 
sample for a number of time periods, while the PISA scores are available only for 
one recent year for only six of the countries in the sample. 
To analyze the correlation between the net enrolment rate in secondary educa-
tion and education expenditures we carried out the regression analysis explained in 
Chapter 4. In column (2) we decide to drop the log of initial per capita GDP, since 
it was not significant in any specification and had a counterintuitive sign. The 
results are given in Table 7. In the baseline specifications (column 1 and 2) the net 
enrollment rate for secondary schools is clearly positively related to the level of 
education spending. This relationship explains about 41% of the variation in the 
sample. However Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) find that public spending on 
education and health has hardly any impact on education and health outcomes in 
poorly governed countries. This finding is verified and confirmed in equation (3) 
where the governance variable is entered in the equation. Doing so the coefficient 
for education expenditure fails to be significant at even to 10 percent level while 
the coefficient for the governance indicator is significant at the 1 percent level; the 
R-square is increased from 41 per cent to 65 percent. 
In columns (3) to (9) we estimate an alternative specification in which govern-
ance affects the outcome through its impact on the effectiveness of spending. We 
do this by entering in the regressions expenditures in education re-scaled by an 
efficiency factor. In column (4) we use as efficiency factor the exponential of the 
average of all the World Bank government scores, and the coefficient on the effi-
ciency scaled expenditures is positive and significant. What that means is that the 
impact of an increase in education expenditures on net enrolment is higher for 
countries with higher governance scores. 
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Table 7. Net Enrolment Rate in Secondary Education and Educations Expenditures in percent of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
2.409  2.418  0.127          G-education/GDP 
[2.855]***  [2.888]***  [0.189]         
    1 9 . 1 6 7           Average of Gover-
nance Scores: ewgi     [ 7 . 0 5 1 ] * * *        
    1.850         G-education/ 
GDP*ewgi      [ 5 . 4 5 1 ] * * *       
     1.692        G-education/ 
GDP*voice account.       [6.315]***      
      1.475       G-education/ 
GDP*pol. stability        [ 1 . 8 3 5 ] *       
       0.811      G-education/ 
GDP*gov. effectiv.         [4.466]***     
        1.098     G-education/ 
GDP*reg. quality          [5.620]***   
         1.190    G-education/ 
GDP*rule of law             [5.667]***  
           0.926  G-education/GDP* 
control of corrup.            [ 4 . 6 5 3 ] * * *
- 0 . 0 2 5             Log(initial per capita 
real gdp)  [ 0 . 0 4 1 ]            
-14.67  -14.93  -0.66 -0.13 5.68 -1.82 -0.89 -0.66 -0.07 -1.34  Trend 
[1.148] [1.234] [0.106] [0.013] [0.576] [0.185] [0.067] [0.056] [0.007] [0.111] 
2.43 2.43 1.68 2.01 1.89 2.13 2.15 2.10 2.08 2.16  Constant 
[4.963]*** [4.965]*** [6.623]*** [5.627]*** [5.542]*** [5.825]*** [4.719]*** [5.244]*** [5.643]*** [5.135]***
Observations  38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
No. of сountries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
R-squared  0.415 0.415 0.648 0.534 0.574 0.501 0.452 0.525 0.512 0.469 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 Includes a dummy for PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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Israel, coefficient not reported (statistically significant). Not significant in regressions with other governance indicators. The explanatory 
variables include the ratio of government expenditure in education to GDP, G-education/GDP, the Log of initial GDP per capita, and effi-
ciency-scaled expenditures in education. The scaling factors are the exponential of the average of the six world governance indicators, ewgi, 
or the exponential of one of the six world governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). A constant and a trend are included to capture other factors not explicitly accounted 
for. 
 
Table 8. Simulated effect of an increase in education expenditure on the net enrolment in the secondary 
Albania  1.1 
Algeria  0.7 
Croatia  2.2 
Egypt  1.2 
Israel  3.4 
Jordan  1.9 
Lebanon  1.2 
Morocco  1.6 
Syria  0.8 
Tunisia  1.9 
Turkey  1.5 
Region Average  1.6 
Region Average Excluding Israel  1.4 
Note. Marginal effect on the net enrollment rate in secondary education associated with increasing education expenditures by 1% of GDP, 
given average governance score of the country over the sample. 
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In further experiments (columns 5 to 10) the spending on education is adjusted 
for a specific governance indicator (using the exponential of the governance 
score). The findings are similar and suggest that education spending does matter 
on average, but when account is taken of country specific governance, the impact 
is enhanced for those countries with good governance and lower for countries with 
lower governance scores
25. As shown in Table 7, running the regressions with 
detailed governance indicators yields slightly different the coefficients, but the 
main results stand. On balance it would appear that the governance indicators that 
reflect voice and accountability and regulatory quality yield the best results in 
terms of explained variation (R square). 
Based on the findings in column (4), Table 7, we could estimate what the effect 
would be of an increase of in education expenditures by one percent of GDP (eve-
rything else constant) on net enrollment in secondary education given the average 
governance score of the country over the sample. Countries with the best govern-
ance score would be able to increase their net enrollment substantially. For in-
stance Croatia could increase it by 2.1 percent (Table 8). On the other hand in 
Syria and Algeria there would be no increase in net enrollment. 
Increasing the governance score would have a greater impact than increasing 
educational spending. This is shown in the simulation reported in Table 9. Bringing 
up the below average governance score of the various countries to the sample aver-
age would increase enrollment by about 2 percent in Syria and 8 per cent in Algeria. 
 
Table 9. Simulated effect of Improving Governance Scores on Net Enrolment in 
Secondary 












Note. Effect on the net enrollment rate in secondary education associated with bringing the 
countries with below average governance score to the sample average and the above aver-
age scores to the best practice score in the sample (Israel). 
                                                 
25 In column 6 we include a dummy for Israel, which is highly significant, but not signifi-
cant when other governance indicators are considered.  PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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The importance of accounting for governance in the analysis is illustrated in 
Figure 3. On the left had cross-plot there is no apparent relationship between aver-
age expenditures and output over the sample, but once we multiply expenditures 
by our factor of efficiency ewgi (the exponential of the average of governance 
scores), some positive correlation seems to appear
26. Inspecting the charts, we can 
see that countries like Algeria spend more than the average in education (left 
chart) while having relatively low enrolment rates in the secondary; once we scale 
expenditures by the governance score, however, the scaled expenditures. In other 
cases, like Croatia, expenditures in education are relatively low (left chart), while 
the enrolment rate is high, but the scales expenditures (right chart), seem more in 
line with the output. The picture is less clear for other countries, perhaps because 
the charts take into account sample averages, and ignore the dynamics in the data. 
 
Figure 3. Expenditure in Education, Governance, and Net Enrolment Rates 
 
 
Now we turn to another education output variable namely the PISA scores. 
These data are only available for six countries in the sample and only for one or 
two years at the end of the period under consideration in this study, which makes 
regression analysis impossible. We can however analyze the cross-plots between 
average expenditures over the sample and the PISA scores. The plots are shown in 
Figure 4. The plots to the left use as the expenditure variable the average govern-
ment expenditure per student in the secondary, in percent of GDP per capita 
(which is more related to PISA scores than general expenditures in education); 
while in the plots to the right, these expenditures are scaled by the index of regula-
tory quality. The plots in the top panel of the figure refer to science scores, while 
the plots in the bottom panel refer to scores for mathematics. Once more, the rela-
                                                 
26 All government indexes, except political stability give very similar plots. 
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tionship between the outcome and expenditure becomes more apparent when we 
take governance into account. Turkey and Jordan for instance seem to spend rela-
tively little in education while having relatively high PISA scores in science, but 
when governance is taken into account these countries move up on the efficiency-
scaled expenditure scale, while countries like Albania and Tunisia (with relatively 
low PISA scores) move down.  
 
Figure 4. Expenditure in Education, Governance, and PISA scores 
 
 
Conclusion: Education expenditures on average do positively affect educa-
tional outcomes. However it does matter greatly how these expenditures are man-
aged. Where poorly managed, as proxied by low governance scores for the coun-
try, they will undermine the positive effect of these expenditures. On the other 
hand good governance will enhance these effects. On balance it would appear that 
the best way to boost educational outcomes is to spend more only if spending is 
efficient.  
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Health 
 
In the analysis of the relationship between outcomes in the health sector and 
government spending, we have focused on three outcome indicators, given the 
available data: (i) life expectancy at birth; (ii) under-five mortality rates, and (iii) 
the maternal mortality ratio. We also looked at immunization rates for measles but 
this variable did not seem related to expenditures in this sector and we did not 
report the results. In the regression analysis, we apply the methodology proposed 
in Chapter 4 to study the relationship between life expectancy at birth and health 
expenditures, as well as the relationship between under five mortality rates and 
health expenditures, but we could not do the same analysis for the third outcome 
indicator (maternal mortality rates) because we have only one or two observations 
per country for this variable, but we do analyze the cross plots. It is also important 
to note that we only have general expenditures in health, and not expenditures 
specially directed at the specific outcomes we are analyzing. 
The results from the regression analysis are shown in Table 10 for life expec-
tancy and Table 11 for under-5 mortality rates. Outcomes seem to have a desired 
and significant correlation with health expenditures (columns 1). In column (2) we 
introduce governance affecting outcomes independently and both for life expec-
tancy and for under-five mortality the impact of expenditures becomes insignifi-
cant, while the coefficient on governance has the desired sign and is statistically 
very significant, suggesting that the relationship between expenditures and health 
may vary across the governance scale. In columns (3) to (9) we replace raw ex-
penditures by measures of expenditures re-scaled by governance. The results are 
similar to those for education, since the coefficients on efficiency-scaled expendi-
tures are significant and have the expected sign. The R-squares also increase when 
we account for governance, in the case of health outcomes. 
Once more we simulate the effect of a 1 percent of GDP increase in health ex-
penditures (ceteris paribus), on health outcomes to understand the differences in 
the impact of expenditures across countries, due to differences in governance 
scores. The results for both life expectancy at birth and under-5 mortality rates are 
shown in Table 12. The estimated impacts on life expectancy range from 0.27 
years in Algeria to 1.27 years in Israel, while those on under-5 mortality rates 
range from -0.1 percent in Algeria to -0.5 percent in Israel. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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Table 10. Life Expectancy at Birth and Government Expenditures in Health in percent of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1.215  0.099          G-health/GDP 
[8.246]***  [0.747]         
  5.749          Average of Govern-
ance Scores: ewgi    [7.400]***         
   0.695         G-health/GDP* 
ewgi     [12.167]***       
    0.603        G-health/GDP* 
voice account.      [11.267]***      
     0.453       G-health/GDP* 
pol. stability       [3.960]***     
      0.492      G-health/GDP* 
gov. effectiv.        [17.913]***     
       0.500     G-health/GDP* 
reg. quality         [16.744]***   
        0.513    G-health/GDP*rule 
of law          [14.202]***  
         0.460  G-health/GDP* 
control of corrup.           [ 1 2 . 9 2 7 ] * * *
0.300 0.259 0.180 0.077 0.414 0.145 0.144 0.180 0.141  Log(initial per capita 
real gdp)  [7.336]*** [7.137]*** [6.589]*** [2.216]**  [3.600]*** [5.625]*** [5.498]*** [7.126]*** [5.249]***
0.07 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.25  Trend 
[0.999] [9.059]***  [3.384]*** [2.761]*** [2.369]** [3.185]***  [4.438]*** [5.042]*** [5.971]***
64.82 56.80 63.92 66.25 62.16 64.77 63.73 62.19 61.85  Constant 
[29.236]*** [51.852]*** [40.695]*** [41.857]*** [23.884]*** [43.477]*** [46.104]*** [42.510]*** [44.734]***
Observations  58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Number  of  country  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-square  0.649  0.85  0.774 0.748 0.225 0.838 0.806 0.769 0.792 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The explanatory variables in-PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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clude the ratio of government expenditure in health to GDP, G-health/GDP, the Log of initial GDP per capita, and efficiency-scaled expenditures in 
health. The scaling factors are the exponential of the average of the six world governance indicators, ewgi, or the exponential of one of the 
six world governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption). A constant and a trend are included to capture other factors not explicitly accounted for. The regressions exclude Turkey 
for lack of expenditure data. 
 
Table 11. Under 5 Mortality Rates and Government Expenditures in Health in percent of GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
-4.831  -0.203          G-health/GDP 
[5.194]***  [0.212]         
  -23.390          Average of Govern-
ance Scores: wgi    [8.190]***         
   - 2 . 7 9 9          G-health/GDP* 
wgi     [8.567]***       
    - 2 . 4 8 5         G-health/GDP* 
voice account.      [7.457]***      
       -3.296       G-health/GDP* 
pol. stability         [2.676]***     
      - 1 . 8 6 3       G-health/GDP* 
gov. effectiv.        [10.415]***     
       - 1 . 9 1 4      G-health/GDP* 
reg. quality         [11.296]***   
        - 1 . 9 3 3     G-health/GDP* 
rule of law          [16.538]***  
         - 1 . 7 0 9   G-health/GDP* 
control of corrup.           [ 1 3 . 8 1 5 ] * * *
-1.433 -1.441 -1.095 -0.663 -1.605 -0.960 -0.994 -1.088 -0.917  Log(initial per capita 
real gdp)  [6.959]*** [7.469]*** [6.572]*** [3.802]*** [4.225]*** [5.561]*** [5.477]*** [7.930]*** [7.081]***
-0.722 -1.118 -0.944 -0.859 -1.006 -0.914 -1.039 -1.181 -1.248  Trend 
[5.060]*** [6.239]*** [8.742]*** [7.663]*** [8.550]*** [8.782]*** [9.733]*** [11.193]*** [11.132]***Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
76.801 101.300 77.191  68.650  81.862 74.178 78.304 83.338 83.052  Constant 
[14.985]*** [19.636]*** [17.180]*** [14.566]*** [16.794]*** [17.142]*** [16.745]*** [19.129]*** [18.450]***
Observations  80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Number  of  country  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-square  0.391  0.538 0.47 0.473  0.266 0.46 0.453  0.422  0.424 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The explanatory variables include the ratio of 
government expenditure in health to GDP, G-health/GDP, the Log of initial GDP per capita, and efficiency-scaled expenditures in health. 
The scaling factors are the exponential of the average of the six world governance indicators, ewgi, or the exponential of one of the six world 
governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption). A constant and a trend are included to capture other factors not explicitly accounted for. The regressions exclude Turkey for lack 
of expenditure data. 
 
Table 12. Simulated Effect of an Increase in Health Expenditure on Health Outcomes 
Based on estimates (3), Tables 10 and 11  Life Expectancy (years)  Under-5 Mortality (per 
1000) 
Albania 0.42  -1.7 
Algeria  0.27 -1.1 
Croatia  0.84 -3.4 
Egypt  0.44 -1.8 
Israel  1.27 -5.1 
Jordan  0.73 -2.9 
Lebanon 0.46  -1.9 
Morocco 0.60  -2.4 
Syria  0.30 -1.2 
Tunisia  0.71 -2.9 
Turkey  0.57 -2.3 
Note. Marginal effect on health outcomes associated with increasing health expenditures by 1% of GDP, given average governance score of 
the country over the sample. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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In order to highlight the important of governance in the analysis, we also simu-
late the effect on health outcome of moving up along the efficiency scale, by im-
proving governance scores (everything else constant). For countries with governance 
scores below the regional average, we simulate the effect on improving the scores to 
the average of the region; for countries that score above the regional average we 
simulate the effect of matching their scores to the best performance of the region. 
The results are shown in Table 13. Comparing Tables 12 and 13, we can see that 
some countries would benefit more by improving governance and therefore effi-
ciency, rather than increasing expenditures. Algeria for instance would increase life 
expectancy by 0.6 years by moving its governance scores up to the regional average, 
and this is twice as much the impact of increasing expenditures by 1% of GDP. 
 
Table 13. Simulated Effect of Improving Governance Scores on Health Outcomes 




Countries scoring below the regional average 
Albania 0.2  -1.0 
Algeria 0.6  -2.2 
Egypt 0.2  -0.8 
Lebanon 0.1  -0.5 
Syria 0.2  -0.8 
Countries scoring above the regional average 
Croatia 1.0  -3.9 
Jordan 1.6  -6.4 
Morocco 0.6  -2.3 
Tunisia 1.1  -4.4 
Turkey -  - 
Note. Effect on the net enrollment rate in secondary education associated with bringing the 
countries with below average governance score to the sample average and the above aver-
age scores to the best practice score in the sample (Israel). 
 
We also analyzed the relationship between health expenditures and maternal 
mortality rates using a cross-plot of these rates against expenditures in health. The 
results are shown in Figure 5. The right hand plot shows expenditures scaled by 
regulatory quality. Again, the relationship between the two variables appears 
clearer when we control for governance. Countries like Algeria, which have rela-
tively high expenditures in health as a share of GDP, but a poor outcome result, 
appear more to the left on the governance-scaled expenditure scale; while coun-
tries like Croatia with an average level of health expenditures to GDP ratio but 
above average outcome, move to the right on the governance-scaled expenditure 
scale. In summary, the scaled measure of expenditures seems more in line with the Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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outcomes achieved. It is also noteworthy that controlling for governance, the elas-
ticity of the outcome with respect to the expenditure variable seems to increase. 
This suggests that a small increase in expenditures may be able to reduce maternal 
mortalities significantly, given the level of governance. 
 
Figure 5. Expenditure in Health, Governance, and Maternal Mortality Rates 
 
 
Conclusion: Health expenditures on average do positively affect health out-
comes. However governance also seems to play an important role. The relation-
ship between outcome and expenditures varies depending on the country’s level of 
governance. An increase in Health expenditures has a more positive impact on 
outcomes for countries that score better in terms of governance indicators. 
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6. Issues for Further Research 
i.  Data used in the analysis need to be refined. More directly relevant data could 
become available if countries were to attach greater importance to collect rele-
vant fiscal and output/outcome data. While the Government Finance Statistics 
published by the International Monetary Fund are a major help in sourcing the 
fiscal data needed for an analysis of the type undertaken here, these data are 
far from complete. Since 2000 GFS does not publish the functional classifica-
tion of expenditure for a number of countries, as a number of countries do not 
classify investment expenditure in the functional breakdown. This has reduced 
the sample that could be used in this study. Also a more detailed set of expen-
diture data would permit a tighter analysis, one that more closely relates fund-
ing, inputs and outcomes. As noted in Section 5 where the efficiency of health 
expenditure was analyzed, the exercise was stymied by the fact that the ex-
penditure data related to expenditures on health in general, while the outcomes 
were specific to much more specific and detailed health subprograms such as 
measles immunization, maternal and under-5 mortality. Also in the analysis of 
efficiency of education expenditure, the study used the expenditure data as re-
ported on education and training incurred by all Ministries, not only the Edu-
cation Ministry. 
ii.  Incorporate in the studies the data on education and health expenditures un-
dertaken by the private sector. The scope of private sector participation in 
these sectors varies across countries and may have a considerable impact on 
the outcomes in these sectors. 
iii.  Extend the present analysis to the economic classification of expenditure to 
verify whether it can be shown that the bias in expenditure composition to-
wards wages and salaries versus other operational expenditures – as per 
budget outcome data rather than ex ant budget data – does impact on out-
comes. Results of such an analysis could strengthen the advice given to some 
governments in the region to reduce the salary bill in favor of other opera-
tional expenditures so as to enhance fiscal stability and improve the contribu-
tion budget expenditures make to growth and budget outcomes. 
iv.  Cross-section analysis versus country specific research 
There are limits to what cross-country analysis and panel data analysis could 
suggest and the policy conclusions that could be drawn from such analysis. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
 
CASE Network Reports No. 94  62 
Therefore, greater effort is needed to undertake country-specific analysis. 
Such analysis could benefit from better data that might well be available to re-
searchers that can approach the various institutions that collect these data. In 
particular a better classification of “productive” and non-productive” expendi-
tures could be tested. A country specific analysis could also go beyond the 
output analysis and investigate the outcomes. For instance, data on the em-
ployment prospects of recent graduates could be used as outcome of the edu-
cational expenditures, and that would be more relevant than net enrollment 
that is used as the output variable. 
v.  Taxation systems: 
This study suggests that economic growth would benefit from a gradual shift 
from income taxes and taxes on external trade to consumption taxes. This con-
clusion is a sweeping one that deserves further analysis in a specific country 
context that can take more factors into account. Most tax analysis agrees that 
income taxes distort labor market incentives and are more prone to tax eva-
sion, and that taxes on external trade reduce the incentives of domestic pro-
ducers to become more efficient and compete in international markets. Also, a 
better analysis of the progressivity or lack thereof of income taxation in the 
various countries that consider moving towards greater dependence on con-
sumption taxes would inform the debate about the trade-off between the two 
broad types of taxes.  
vi.  Measures of Government Efficiency 
Government efficiency indicators could be constructed for study-specific pur-
poses such as the current study of the fiscal policy and growth linkages. More 
tailor-made governance indicators would track such data as the adoption of as 
medium-term budget planning, initiatives to introduce performance budgeting, 
etc. (listed in the Public Finance in EMU -2008). These would be better tar-
geted to the subject matter of the research on quality of fiscal policy than the 
governance variables used in this study that were compiled with another and 
broader objective in mind. Such fiscal policy governance indicators could also 
inform the design of a fiscal policy reform program. 
vii.  Undertake studies to check the present findings with those of a benchmark et 
of countries. This study ran into data gathering problems and time constraints 
to compare the results with some benchmarks or comparator countries as ini-
tially envisaged. Clearly the obtained results are consistent with those ob-
tained in the EC (2008) study on the subject. Future research could investigate 
whether they are consistent with those that that apply for a broader group of 
comparable developing countries (e.g. lower and middle income countries) or 
for recently acceded Member States. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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7. Summary and recommendations 
 
 
7.1.  Summary 
 
This study was to help develop a framework for the analysis of quality of pub-
lic finances in the context of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries and to help 
develop a more specific agenda for future research and policy dialogue for the EU 
partner countries in this area. It is based on the conceptual framework prepared by 
the European Commission (2008) that was used to analyze this topic for the EMU 
countries and on a series of studies undertaken by the World Bank and others that 
investigated the impact of fiscal policy on growth. These studies while recognizing 
that fiscal stability is a pre-condition for economic growth, aimed at tracking down 
other channels of the impact of fiscal policy on growth. In the process the impact 
of the size of government on growth and stability, and of the composition of ex-
penditures and revenues on economic growth were investigated. Additionally the 
framework investigated the quality of expenditures in key sectors and how fiscal 
governance might affect the growth impact of the budget expenditures. 
The analysis was to be applied to all countries included in The Barcelona Proc-
ess Union for the Mediterranean. So as to ensure that all data used in the analysis 
were comparable the study used internationally available macroeconomic, fiscal, 
governance and outcome data. Data limitations limited to analysis of fiscal policy 
and growth to use data for Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mo-
rocco, Syria, Tunisia, Croatia, and Turkey. Even for these countries not all data 
were available for the full extent of the time period under consideration. The 
analysis was based on panel data regression analysis; a detailed description of the 
methodology and the data used is provided respectively in Section 4 and Annex 1. 
The main findings of this study conform largely to those obtained in the earlier 
literature with the added twist that the growth performance of the countries in the 
sample is found to be very sensitive to the quality of governance in the countries 
retained in the sample. For instance the basic regression specification suggests that 
size of government does not impact on growth performance. However, when gov-
ernance indicators are introduced the results change and now suggest that com-
bined with favorable governance indicators, large governments do positively in-
fluence growth. As such the negative growth effect of taxation is compensated by 
positive effect of public spending. With less favorable governance indicators large Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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governments do depress growth and the negative effect of growth that results from 
taxation are emphasized by negative impact of government spending. 
The traditional emphasis that the way government finances its expenditures 
impact on stability and growth is confirmed as under any regression specification 
growth suffers from deficit financing and debt. Also confirmed is the fact that the 
negative effect on growth caused by consumption taxes is several times smaller 
than the negative impact of income taxes. The latter appear to distort incentives in 
a way that harms growth. This result contains lessons for tax reform; also because 
it suggests a likely negative effect on growth when tax policy relies heavily on 
income taxation to pursue affect income distribution and “fair” distribution of the 
tax burden amongst other objectives. Obviously the design and administration of 
the various taxes as well as tax compliance will impact on the income distribu-
tional impact of these various taxes. 
The study investigated the efficiency of education and health expenditures, two 
components of the expenditure of countries that attract large amount of resources 
and whose outcomes have been retained in the Millennium Development Goals. 
Education expenditures were not found to improve education outcomes – defined 
as net enrollment in secondary education – when no account is taken of the coun-
try governance scores. However when these indicators are used to weight the edu-
cation expenditure, the result suggests that countries with good scores can obtain 
very significant improvements in their education outcomes, whereas for countries 
with poor governance scores these additional expenditures would hardly improve 
their education outcomes. If countries that score low on their governance indica-
tors would increase their score to the sample average, they could enhance educa-
tional outcomes substantially. The analysis was also applied to the efficiency of 
health expenditures and basically similar results were obtained. For the same level 
of expenditure, countries with good governance scores achieve much better results 
in terms of infant mortality and life expectancy than countries that score low. 
The study suggest that further research on this topic could well covert the fol-
lowing issues; (i) collect better fiscal and outcome data so that the relationship 
between the two is tighter;(ii) undertake country specific studies that can benefit 
from better data but also can take additional country specific variables into ac-
count,(iii) improve on the data used to proxy governance by collecting data the 
better reflect governance in the domain of public finance management, (iv) deeper 
analysis of the tax system of individual countries taxes – design, administration as 
well as compliance – to better analyze the trade-off between tax structure and 
growth. A better understanding of how the tax structure affects income distribution 
could inform the tax reform program. 
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7.2.  Recommendations 
 
•  Maintaining stability has proven to be a precondition for growth. 
Hence policies that contribute to maintaining a sustainable budgetary 
stance are important to achieve growth. They are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition and should remain high on the policy agenda. Fis-
cal rules can contribute to stability as was shown in the EU2009 
(pp148-151). These rules include capping expenditure growth, the use 
of windfall revenues, rules regarding balance budget or rules that re-
quire that additional budget expenditures can only be approved when 
additional revenues are generated, having external institutions provide 
the macro “cadrage” for the budget preparations. The public should be 
made aware that the budget is being prepared within the context of 
fiscal rules and top level policy support for the adherence of the fiscal 
rules should be mustered.  
•  This study has shown that governance matters in fiscal performance. 
Even though the indictors used were rather generic and constructed as 
a broad indicator of governance in a country, they suggest that a broad 
measure of governance matters a lot. Countries could look in greater 
detail on how to implement good governance in budget preparation 
and execution. Medium term programming of the budget and intro-
ducing elements of performance budgeting are steps that might greatly 
contribute to achieving good budget outcomes.  
•  Adopting a medium-term budgetary framework would provide the 
public institutions as well as the private sector greater predictability of 
budget allocation sheltering them from drastic modifications that dis-
rupt service delivery and business plans.  
•  Adopting pure performance budgeting, that closely links inputs to re-
sults is probably beyond the means of the countries in the MED re-
gion. However much can be gained by adopting performance in-
formed budget (PIB) procedures. These would attempt to better relate 
funds towards results. In the process data would need to be collected 
on both, an exercise that might inform the budget discussions, and 
could lead to practices that improve over the often adopted across the 
board changes in budget allocations based on last years allocations. 
This PIB could be tested in sectors where the measurement of outputs 
and results present the least difficulties, such as education and health. 
This would imply that the composition of expenditures in these sectors 
be subjected to closer scrutiny. Not only budgeted amounts would Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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need to be analyzed, but also actually disbursed amounts, which often 
differ greatly from those, budgeted. The structure of expenditure 
across the sector would be focused upon (e.g. higher versus primary 
education and preventive versus hospital care) as the composition of 
expenditure within the broad categories probably impact more on 
growth than the overall allocation of these funds to these sectors. 
•  Reducing “non productive” expenditures and using these funds to in-
crease “productive” expenditures would enhance growth perspectives. 
This would certainly apply to the gradual reduction of fuel and food 
subsidies that distort the incentive structure in the economy. There are 
limits to such shifts in the structure of expenditures as expenditures 
that provide public goods need to be maintained at a critical level to 
ensure the general environment that enables economic activity includ-
ing the respect of property rights and security. 
•  Analyze tax policy within the context not only of the economic impact 
of the various taxes but also with a view on administrative capacity to 
effectively and efficiently administer these taxes. It might be that in 
general income taxes have a greater growth depressing effect than 
consumption taxes. However how these taxes are administered in any 
given country and how they interact with the structure of the economy 
are important issues that need to inform the tax policy debate. This 
will necessitate a careful country specific review of the tax policy and 
administration. 
•  While trade liberalization improves resource allocation, it will lead to 
lower taxes on international trade. Substituting taxation on domestic 
consumption for the taxes on international trade will further enhance a 
country’s growth perspective. Tax policy to strengthen domestic con-
sumption taxes should accompany trade liberalization. PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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Appendix A. Data Sources 
 
 
Government Finance Statistics: 
 
Most data used in this report were obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). This publication contains detailed 
revenue and expenditure data for most of its Member countries. When it was pos-
sible we took consolidated government information, when this information was 
not available or incomplete we used central government information. Ideally all 
countries should report expenditure statistics on the functional and economic clas-
sification as well as a revenue breakdown and changes in fiscal assets. In reality 
the data are only partially available as some countries do not report all the desired 
data. Furthermore in 2000 the methodology for compiling expenditure data as 
changed from cash basis to accrual basis. The latter methodology does not corre-
spond with the data gathering procedures in many countries. As a result a number 
of countries did not communicate expenditure breakdown to the IMF after 2000. A 
major effort was undertaken to complete the GFS published data by consulting the 
statistical Annexes contained in the periodic Country Consultation Reports that 
have become publicly available on the IMF website. So as to have long time series 
available the data used for this study combine the county series compiled either on 
a cash (before 2000 for all countries retained in the sample and several that did not 
report accrual data to IFS) and on an accrual basis. The authors believe that this 
hybrid approach does not impact on the findings of this study. 
Expenditure data: 
The series for productive expenditure is made up of: Economic Affairs, Agri-
culture Affairs, Mining, Manufacturing and Construction, Transport, Communica-
tion, Housing, Health, Education and Environmental protection. 
The series on non-productive investment is made up of: General Public Ser-
vices, Public Debt, Transfers Between Levels, Defense, Public Order, Fuel, En-
ergy and Social Protection. 
Revenue data: 
Revenue data is made up of: Taxes, Taxes on Income and Profit, General Taxes 
on Goods and Services, Taxes on International Trade and Transactions and Grants. 
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Debt data were taken from GFS or from the Consultation reports. Failing that 
defined the deficit as the difference between revenue and expenditure. 
 
Other Fiscal Data: 
 
Fiscal information was further complemented using the Global Development 
Finance – GDF- database (World Bank). The following fiscal indicators where 
obtained: Debt outstanding, Foreign direct investment (net inflows) Grants, Total 
Debt/Exports (%), Total Debt/GNP (%), Total Debt Stocks (DOD, US$) and Short 
Term Debt Outstanding (DOD, US$). 
 
Health outcome indicators:  
 
Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Statistics (World Bank) database pro-
vided the following health Indicators: Lifetime Risk of Maternal Debt, Life Expec-
tancy at Birth, measles immunization and under 5 Mortality. The latter series is 
available only on a five year basis for the earlier years, and the missing data were 
interpolated. 
 
Education Outcomes:  
 
Educational (ED-Stat) Statics (World Bank) provided the following education 
indicators: Literacy Rate Adult (Total), Average Years of Schooling of Adults 
(Total), Graduates in Science (% of Total), Current Education Expenditure on 
Teaching Materials (% primary), Net Enrolment Rate (secondary), PISA: highest 
level of proficiency in science and Math, PISA: mean performance in science and 




Indicators on Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence (PV), Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Con-
trol of Corruption, where obtained in the World Bank website of Governance Mat-
ters for 2008: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.aspWB. For 
earlier years data were only available for every other year; the missing years were PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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obtained by interpolation so as not to lose a large number of observations and 
strengthen the results. 
 
Macroeconomic indicators.  
 
1.  World Economic Outlook : GDP per capital (constant prices) and GDP 
per capital purchasing power parity (current prices). 
2.  IFS: Consumer Prices, Goods: Exports f.o.b., Goods Imports f.o.b., 
Direct Investment in the Rep. Economy, Net Cash Inflow, Net 
Lending/Borrowing, Gross Domestic Product, GDP Deflator and 
Population. 
3.  World Development Indicator : External Debt (total DOD, current US$), 
GDP (current US$), Cash Surplus/Deficit % of GDP and Gross Capital 
Formation % of GDP. 
 
Infrastructure outcome:  
1.  Global Competitiveness Reports, (World Economic Forum) information 
on Quality of infrastructure. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR08/ 
GCR08.pdf. 
2.  From the World Development Indicators, information on percentage of 
paved roads. Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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Appendix B. Data Availability 
 
 
Table Annex B.1. Data Availability for Regression Analysis 
GDP per capita and input/outcome variables: 








Albania 1981-2008  1999-2004  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Algeria 1981-2008  1980-2004  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Croatia 1981-2008  1990-2006  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Egypt 1981-2008  1993-2002  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Israel 1981-2008  1999-2006  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Jordan 1981-2008  1975-2006  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Lebanon 1981-2008  1997-2007  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Morocco 1981-2008  1975-2003  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Syria 1981-2008  1975-2007  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Tunisia 1981-2008  1975-2003  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Turkey 1981-2008  1985-2006  1972-2006  1970-2006 
Middle and Low 
Income Countries  1981-2007 1990-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 
Macro Variables, Debt, and Governance: 
   Openness Inflation  Debt   Governance 
Indicators 
Albania 1981-2008  1980-2007  1991-2007  1996-2007 
Algeria 1981-2008  1980-1991  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Croatia 1993-2008  1993-2007  1993-2007  1996-2007 
Egypt 1981-2008  1980-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Israel 1981-2008  1980-2007  1992-2008  1996-2007 
Jordan 1981-2008  1980-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Lebanon 1981-2008  2002-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Morocco 1981-2008  1980-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Syria 1981-2008  1980-2006  1980-2006  1996-2007 
Tunisia 1981-2008  1980-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Turkey 1981-2008  1980-2007  1980-2007  1996-2007 
Middle and Low 
Income Countries  - - - - 
Government Expenditures: 
   Total  Unproduc-
tive  Productive Education  Health 
Albania  1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-1998 1995-1998 
Algeria  1994-2007 1994-2007 1994-1999 1994-1999 1994-1999 
Croatia  1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Egypt  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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Israel  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Jordan  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Lebanon  1993-2007 1993-2007 1993-2007 1993-2007 1993-2007 
Morocco  1990-2008 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 
Syria  1990-2007 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 
Tunisia  1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2007 1990-2008 
Turkey 1990-2007  - -  1998-2004  - 
Middle and Low 
Income Countries - - - - - 
Government Revenues: 










Albania 1995-2004  1995-2004  1995-2005  1995-20004 1995-2004 
Algeria  1994-2007 1994-2007 1994-2008 1994-2007 1994-2007 
Croatia  1992-2007 1992-2007 1992-2008 1992-2007 1992-2007 
Egypt  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1999-2007 1990-2007 
Israel  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Jordan  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1999-2007 1990-2007 
Lebanon  1993-2007 1993-2007 1993-2008 1998-2007 1993-2007 
Morocco  1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 1990-2007 
Syria  1990-2007  1990-1999  1990-1999 - 1990-1999 
Tunisia  1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 
Turkey  1990-2007 1980-2007 1980-2008 1980-2007 1980-2007 
Middle and Low 
Income Countries -   - - - - 
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Appendix C. Data Availability 
 
 






























Albania  -0.203 -0.602 -0.542 -0.187 -0.868 -0.706 -0.518 -0.298 
Algeria  -1.124 -1.798 -0.666 -0.751 -0.904 -0.629 -0.978 -0.759 
Croatia  0.271 0.288 0.332 0.241 -0.058  -0.071 0.167 0.334 
Egypt  -0.995 -0.724 -0.345 -0.313 -0.045 -0.348 -0.462 -0.579 
Israel  0.670 -1.052 1.048 0.987 0.911 1.010 0.596 0.559 
Jordan  -0.498  -0.198 0.143 0.311 0.384 0.133 0.046 0.088 
Lebanon -0.437 -0.959 -0.223 -0.182 -0.293 -0.410 -0.417 -0.779 
Morocco -0.479 -0.306 -0.067 -0.077 0.027 -0.016 -0.153 -0.285 
Syria  -1.576 -0.560 -0.868 -1.067 -0.403 -0.625 -0.850 -0.986 
Tunisia -0.907 0.184 0.527 0.122 0.075 0.156 0.026 -0.021 
Turkey -0.336  -0.934  0.010  0.253 -0.021 -0.147 -0.196 -0.077 
Region Average  -0.249  -0.255 
Region Average Excluding Israel  -0.334  -0.336 
 
 
Table Annex C.2. Fiscal Policy and Growth - Results with time invariant measure of 
governance 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.181 -0.243  -0.236 -0.319 -0.264 -0.266  Real per capita 
growth rate(-1)  [1.205] [1.749]*  [1.695]*  [2.155]** [1.904]* [1.919]* 
0.022  0.030 0.041 0.030 0.018 0.017  Openness 
[1.153] [1.582]  [1.996]** [1.717]* [1.131]  [1.053] 
-0.044 -0.111  -0.117 -0.118 -0.117 -0.115  Inflation 
[1.113] [2.107]** [2.270]** [2.506]** [2.260]** [2.245]** 
-0.026 0.239 0.228 0.419 0.329 0.328  Log(initial per 
capita real gdp)  [0.161] [1.814]*  [1.653]*  [2.926]*** [2.453]** [2.464]** 
-0.019 0.122 0.120 0.045      Expenditures/ 
GDP (-1)  [0.288]  [1.299] [1.276] [0.486]     
      0.127  0.118  Expenditures/GDP 
(-1)*Mean(ewgi)        [2.574]** [3.210]*** 
-0.007 0.048    -0.036  -0.020    Revenues/ 
GDP(-1)  [0.121]  [0.983]  [0.582]  [0.331]  PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.054 -0.067  -0.068 -0.075 -0.069 -0.069  Debt/GDP 
[2.894]*** [4.183]*** [4.204]*** [4.740]*** [4.494]*** [4.606]*** 
     4.819     Ewgi 
     [2.861]***   
6.656  -0.886 0.130 -1.195 1.493 1.199  Constant 
[3.987]*** [0.342] [0.055] [0.547] [0.926] [0.882] 
  -4.619 -3.886 -7.423 -9.240 -9.003  Dummy Israel 
 [2.694]*** [2.336]** [4.654]*** [3.877]*** [4.202]*** 
  5.500 5.659 4.751 4.565 4.618  Dummy Turkey 
 [2.279]** [2.309]** [2.093]** [1.868]*  [1.928]* 
Observations  108  108 108 108 108 108 
Number of coun-
try  10  10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared  0.157  0.277 0.271  0.33  0.300 0.299 
Chi  squ.  18.362  42.198 41.312  79.05  63.513 61.985 
Prob  >  Chi  squ.  0.010  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The control variables include macroeconomic indicators (the openness ration and the 
rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita gdp in 1980); and a governance 
indictor (the average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), G/GDP(-1), the ratio of total 
revenues to GDP (lagged one period), and the debt to GDP ratio. A variable capturing the 
effect of government expenditures re-scaled by governance Expenditures/GDP(-1)* 
Mean(ewgi) is also considered, where Mean(ewgi) is the sample mean of the exponential 
of the average of the six World Bank governance scores. The sample is unbalanced and 
includes observations form 1996-2008. Algeria is excluded due to few observation towards 
the end of the sample. 
 
 
Table Annex C.1. Composition of Fiscal Policy and Growth - Results with a time 
invariant measure of governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.395 -0.384 -0.383 -0.393 -0.393 -0.527  Per capita growth 
rate (-1)  [2.711]*** [2.680]*** [2.617]*** [2.630]*** [2.672]*** [4.518]*** 
0.049 0.062 0.069 0.045 0.054 0.067  Openness 
[2.404]** [3.203]*** [3.790]*** [2.432]** [2.566]** [3.403]*** 
-0.334 -0.353 -0.334 -0.323 -0.366 -0.580  Inflation 
[2.673]*** [2.846]*** [2.642]*** [2.435]** [2.728]*** [5.413]*** 
0.522 0.562 0.692 0.622 0.677 0.609  Log(initial per 
capita real gdp)  [3.612]*** [3.795]*** [4.671]*** [4.968]*** [4.436]*** [3.947]*** 
0.090  0.078       Unproductive 
Exp./GDP (-1)  [1.636]  [1.436]      
0.223  0.253  0.249      Productive 
Exp./GDP (-1)  [2.057]** [2.213]** [2.081]**    Luc De Wulf, Leonor Coutinho, Cyrus Sassanpour, Santiago Florez
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      0.203 0.284 0.493  Productive Exp./ 
GDP(-1)* 
Mean(ewgi)      [2.433]** [2.591]*** [5.626]*** 
0.064        Revenues/ 
GDP(-1)  [1.203]       
     -0.166    Tax Revenues/ 
GDP (-1)         [1.210]  
      -1.191  Income Taxes/ 
GDP (-1)        [4.727]*** 
      -0.347  Consumption 
Taxes/GDP (-1)        [3.208]*** 
      -0.770  Taxes on External 
Trade/GDP(-1)        [3.414]*** 
-0.114 -0.117 -0.114 -0.103 -0.108 -0.164  Debt/GDP  
[6.971]*** [7.209]*** [7.058]*** [6.194]*** [5.769]*** [7.289]*** 
-1.792 -1.009 -1.104 1.066  2.708 11.141  Constant 
[0.664] [0.422] [0.410] [0.545] [1.251]  [3.451]*** 
-6.049 -5.187 -4.373 -7.270 -7.448 -2.515  Dummy Israel 
[3.879]*** [4.342]*** [4.369]*** [3.992]*** [4.229]*** [1.267] 
Observations  82 82 82 82 82 68 
Number  of  country  9 9 9 9 9 8 
R-squared  0.467 0.458 0.434 0.447 0.461 0.587 
Chi  squ.  104.497  90.131 96.714 89.199 90.358  101.939 
Prob  >  Chi  squ.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The control variables include macroeconomic indicators (the openness ration and the 
rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita GDP in 1980); and a governance 
indictor (the average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the 
ratio of unproductive government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), Unproductive 
Exp/GDP(-1); the ratio of productive government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), 
Productive Exp/GDP(-1); the ratio of total revenues to GDP (lagged one period), and the 
debt to GDP ratio. A variable capturing the effect of government expenditures re-scaled by 
governance Productive Exp./GDP (-1)*Mean(ewgi) is also considered, where Mean(ewgi) 
is the sample mean of the exponential of the average of the six World Bank governance 
scores. The sample is unbalanced and includes observations form 1996-2008. Algeria is 
excluded due to few observations towards the end of the sample. Turkey is excluded from 
lack of comparable data, and data on tax composition could not be found for Syria. 
 
Table Annex C.4. Fiscal Policy and Growth - Results with a dummy for governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.181 -0.243 -0.236 -0.281 -0.300 -0.305 -0.305  Real per 
capita growth 
rate (-1)  [1.205] [1.749]*  [1.695]*  [2.000]** [2.078]** [2.161]** [2.162]** 
0.022  0.030  0.041 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008  Openness 
[1.153] [1.582]  [1.996]** [0.359] [0.469] [0.431] [0.431] PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
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  (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0.044 -0.111 -0.117 -0.125 -0.132 -0.134 -0.130  Inflation 
[1.113] [2.107]** [2.270]**  [2.446]** [2.659]***[2.740]***[2.701]***
-0.026 0.239 0.228 0.442 0.513 0.531 0.511  Log(initial 
per capita 
real gdp)  [0.161] [1.814]*  [1.653]*  [2.971]***[3.049]***[3.224]***[3.438]***
-0.019 0.122 0.120 0.103 0.026      Expenditures/
GDP (-1)  [0.288] [1.299] [1.276] [1.133] [0.267]     
     0.128  0.134  0.121  Expenditures/
GDP(-1) 
*Dgov       [2.891]***[3.254]***[3.786]***
-0.007 0.048    -0.030 -0.030 -0.034    Revenues/ 
GDP(-1)  [0.121] [0.983]    [0.492] [0.500] [0.569]   
-0.054 -0.067 -0.068 -0.077 -0.081 -0.082 -0.080  Debt/GDP 
[2.894]***[4.183]***[4.204]***[4.677]***[4.649]***[4.681]***[5.030]***
    3.496      Dgov 
    [2.812]***    
6.656 -0.886 0.130 1.387 3.181 3.827 3.084  Constant 
[3.987]*** [0.342] [0.055] [0.536] [1.055]  [1.995]**  [2.244]** 
  -4.619 -3.886 -5.705 -6.670 -6.436 -6.460  Dummy 
Israel   [2.694]*** [2.336]**  [3.491]***[4.179]***[5.151]***[5.125]***
  5.500 5.659 4.879 4.905 4.965 4.983  Dummy 
Turkey   [2.279]** [2.309]**  [2.021]** [2.080]** [2.125]** [2.140]** 
Observations  108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Number of  
country  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared  0.157 0.277 0.271 0.314 0.319 0.318 0.316 
Chi  squ.  18.362 42.198 41.312 77.775 84.009 81.101 72.415 
Degrees of 
freedom  0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The control variables include macroeconomic indicators (the openness ration and the 
rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita gdp in 1980); and a governance 
indictor (the average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), G/GDP(-1), the ratio of total 
revenues to GDP (lagged one period), and the debt to GDP ratio. A variable capturing the 
interaction between government expenditures and governance, Expenditures/GDP(-1) 
*Dgov is also included, where Dgov is a dummy that takes the value 1 for countries with a 
mean average governance index (Mean(ewgi)) above 1. The sample is unbalanced and 
includes observations form 1996-2008. Algeria is excluded due to few observation towards 
the end of the sample. 
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Table Annex C.5. Composition of Fiscal Policy and Growth - Results with a dummy for governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-0.395 -0.384 -0.383 -0.397 -0.399 -0.400 -0.522  Per capita growth rate (-1) 
[2.711]*** [2.680]*** [2.617]*** [2.652]*** [2.579]*** [2.598]*** [3.586]*** 
0.049 0.062 0.069 0.050 0.037 0.039 0.038  Openness 
[2.404]** [3.203]***  [3.790]*** [2.551]** [2.045]** [2.078]**  [1.700]* 
-0.334 -0.353 -0.334 -0.327 -0.313 -0.333 -0.499  Inflation 
[2.673]*** [2.846]*** [2.642]***  [2.541]** [2.318]** [2.438]**  [3.806]*** 
0.522 0.562 0.692 0.687 0.577 0.596 0.457  Log(initial per capita real gdp) 
[3.612]*** [3.795]*** [4.671]*** [4.686]*** [4.343]*** [3.962]*** [2.779]*** 
0.090  0.078        Unproductive Exp./GDP(-1) 
[1.636]  [1.436]       
0.223 0.253 0.249 0.165        Productive Exp./GDP (-1) 
[2.057]**  [2.213]**  [2.081]**  [1.037]     
      0.083 0.144 0.173 0.303  Productive Exp./GDP(-1)*Dgov 
    [0.996]  [2.348]**  [2.189]**  [5.003]*** 
0.064         Revenues/GDP(-1) 
[1.203]        
      -0.083    Tax Revenues/GDP(-1) 
      [0.640]   
       - 0 . 9 0 9   Income Taxes/GDP(-1) 
       [3.484]*** 
       - 0 . 2 3 5   Consumption Taxes/GDP(-1) 
       [ 2 . 2 1 5 ] * *  
       - 0 . 7 2 7   Taxes on External Trade/ 
GDP(-1)         [2.928]*** 
-0.114 -0.117 -0.114 -0.110 -0.099 -0.101 -0.133  Debt/GDP  
[6.971]*** [7.209]*** [7.058]*** [6.797]*** [5.572]*** [5.225]*** [4.939]*** 
-1.792 -1.009 -1.104 0.250  3.031  4.251 13.523  Constant 
[0.664] [0.422] [0.410] [0.084]  [1.909]* [1.857]*  [3.580]*** PUBLIC FINANCES IN SUPPORT OF GROWTH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 94  79 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-6.049 -5.187 -4.373 -4.865 -4.636 -4.201 1.348  Dummy Israel 
[3.879]*** [4.342]*** [4.369]*** [4.741]*** [4.554]*** [3.394]***  [0.603] 
Observations  82 82 82 82 82 82 68 
Number  of  country  9 9 9 9 9 9 8 
R-squared  0.467 0.458 0.434 0.441 0.432 0.436 0.521 
Chi  squ.  104.497  90.131 96.714 92.244 59.695 63.099 60.226 
Prob  >  Chi  squ.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The control variables include macroeconomic 
indicators (the openness ration and the rate of inflation); initial conditions (log of per-capita GDP in 1980); and a governance indictor (the 
average of the world governance index scores). Fiscal variables include the ratio of unproductive government expenditures to GDP (lagged 
on period), Unproductive Exp/GDP(-1); the ratio of productive government expenditures to GDP (lagged on period), Productive Exp/ 
GDP(-1); the ratio of total revenues to GDP (lagged one period), and the debt to GDP ratio.A variable capturing the interaction between 
productive government expenditures and governance, Productive Exp./GDP (-1)*Dgov is also included, where Dgov is a dummy that takes 
the value 1 for countries with a mean average governance index (Mean(ewgi)) above 1. The sample is unbalanced and includes observations 
form 1996-2008. Algeria is excluded due to few observation towards the end of the sample. 
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Table Annex C.2. Net Enrolment - Regressions using alternative specifications 
  (1) (2) 
 0.589  G-education 
 [1.623] 
1.759   G-education/GDP*Mean(ewgi) 
[4.875]***  
 2.125  G-education/GDP*Dgov 
 [2.767]*** 
-0.387 0.529  Log(initial per capita real gdp) 
[0.861] [1.111] 
2.013 1.975  Trend 
[5.740]*** [5.047]*** 
3.863 -4.829  Constant 
[0.302] [0.385] 
Observations 38  38 
No. of сountries 8  8 
R-squared 0.536  0.484 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
Table Annex C.7. Health Outcomes - Regressions using alternative specifications 
Life Expectancy  Under-5 Mortality   
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 -0.980  15.941  G-health 
 [2.187]**   [6.608]*** 
0.748  -2.920   G-health/ 
GDP*Mean(ewgi)  [17.763]***   [9.981]***  
 1.906   -17.933  G-health/GDP*Dgov 
 [5.578]***  [8.269]*** 
0.174 0.394 -1.101  -2.535  Log(initial per capita 
real gdp)  [7.312]*** [8.255]*** [6.107]*** [6.694]*** 
0.123 0.115 -0.836  -0.881  Trend 
[2.645]*** [2.090]** [7.424]***  [5.328]*** 
65.002 64.013 74.015 77.231  Constant 
[41.691]*** [35.582]*** [15.798]*** [21.400]*** 
Observations  58 58 80 80 
No. of сountries  10 10 10 10 
R-squared  0.809 0.739 0.466 0.688 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
 